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ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: Combating Terrorism in the Digital Era: How Facebook and Twitter Can  
   Aid American Counterterrorism Efforts 
 
Thesis Adviser: Professor Melvyn Levitsky 
Despite the billions of dollars that the American government spends annually to combat terrorism, 
terrorists maintain a strong presence both domestically and internationally. The rise of social media 
in the past ten years has added an extra layer of difficulty in the United States’ attempts to prevent 
terrorism. Terrorists use social media to spread their messages, plan attacks, and recruit civilians 
world-wide. While Facebook and Twitter do track terrorist activity on their sites, they fail to 
discover all content and to share information with governmental counterterrorism agencies, who 
could use this data to combat terrorism. But how can American counterterrorism agencies 
collaborate with Facebook’s and Twitter’s security teams in order to more effectively counteract 
terrorism? This thesis argues that, through the creation of a legal policy, Twitter and Facebook can 
share terrorist content that they identify with the American National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC). The NCTC can then share this information with other counterterrorism agencies in order 
to identify, track, and arrest or extradite terrorists and to thwart terrorist activities. The thesis 
discusses the current inefficacies of American counterterrorism strategies and the possible 
information that counterterrorism agencies could gain from social media in order to prove the 
necessity of the policy recommendation. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
I.I An Introduction to Terrorism 
September 11, 2001. January 7, 2015. December 19, 2016. These days now remain 
marked in history, united by one common theme: terrorism. But the attacks on the World Trade 
Center, Charlie Hebdo newspaper, and Berlin Christmas Market present only three of thousands 
of terrorist attacks world-wide that have occurred in the past two decades. Beyond the obvious 
physical impacts of terrorist attacks, including human casualties and infrastructural damage, 
these events sow and spread fear, hatred, and division in the societies in which they occur. Social 
media, with platforms that billions of individuals use to connect world-wide, has played a role in 
some of these attacks, as terrorist organizations use these sites to recruit new followers and to 
spread propaganda. The American government and social media companies like Facebook and 
Twitter recognize this threat, but the two factions rarely collaborate on information sharing and 
other counterterrorism tactics. Thus, American counterterrorism agencies lack crucial sources of 
information that they could use in conjunction with data from other places to help combat 
terrorism (Steinbach).  
How, then, can American counterterrorism agencies collaborate with Facebook and 
Twitter’s security teams in order to more effectively counteract terrorism? In this thesis I respond 
that American counterterrorism agencies can create a policy which would obligate Facebook and 
Twitter to share information gathered from terrorists’ accounts and would allow the government 
to charge suspects based upon social media activity. The content from social media, used in 
conjunction with other data collection and counterterrorism methods, would help the agencies to 
prevent attacks and to locate terrorists, which would lead to the arrest of suspects and the 
destabilization of terrorist organizations. While current counterterrorism tactics in the United 
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States and world-wide appear to have reduced the number of annual terrorist attacks from major 
foreign terrorist organizations, the United States faces increased attacks from homegrown 
terrorists, American civilians inspired to act by the messages and actions of foreign terrorist 
groups (Allen). The immediate and wide-spread communication on social media facilitates an 
effective method for terrorists to continuously disseminate their beliefs and to recruit followers. 
Social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter do attempt to remove this information 
from their platforms, but the companies do not share terrorists’ information with American 
counterterrorism agencies unless pressured (Steinbach). Thus, in order to allow counterterrorism 
agencies to tap into and use such data in order to effectively combat terrorism, I argue that a 
legal policy provides the best solution to the problem of information access, and I outline a 
model for such a policy. 
In this chapter, Chapter 1, I introduce the concept of terrorism. Because no singular 
definition of terrorism exists in the world, let alone the United States, I create a definition under 
which my thesis and policy proposal can operate. Because this thesis centers on America and 
social media, I analyze and incorporate characteristics of terrorism as identified by the U.S. Code 
§ 2331, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and Facebook. The other 
governmental agencies that contend with terrorism and Twitter do not define terrorism, so I do 
not mention them in my definition. After this discussion I outline the thesis’ chapters and justify 
my choices, through a discussion of the methodologies that I utilize, in order to validate the 
arguments that I pose throughout the thesis. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the goal that 
my thesis hopes to achieve: to create a means of information gathering that can effectively assist 
American counterterrorism agencies in identifying and targeting more terrorists in order to 
thwart their actions, destabilize their organizations, and promote security world-wide. 
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I.II Defining Terrorism 
 The concept of terrorism might initially appear easy to define. Individuals with extremist 
ideologies commit violent actions against others. But who are these individuals? Why do they 
commit acts of violence, and who (or what) do they target? Before American government 
agencies can begin to combat terrorism, they require one cohesive, specific definition to 
conceptualize the crime that addresses all of these questions. Private companies, international 
organizations, and different government beaurocracies currently lack a singular, solid definition 
of terrorism. The lack of cohesion between these groups’ definitions of terrorism results from the 
differences in the goals of each agency and from the legal weight of the designation as a 
“terrorist.” This classification allows the government to harshly punish accused individuals under 
national and international laws and effectively brands the accused as violent radicals. If 
international agencies do not strictly classify crimes pertaining to terrorism, they risk unjustly 
condemning suspects or freeing truly culpable individuals who may continue to attack civilians 
and governments (UNDOC). While the United Nations has attempted to create a definition of 
terrorism since 2000, debates between individual countries continue to bar its attempts. Some 
countries (like the United States) push for stricter and broader definitions, while Arab countries 
and groups like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation hope to differentiate between acts of 
terrorism and valid actions by colonized and oppressed peoples to seek independence under the 
protection of international law. America’s “terrorists” may represent other countries’ “freedom 
fighters” or “guerrilla groups” (European Union, European Parliamentary Research Service 1-2). 
Because this thesis concentrates on the potential uses of social media by American 
counterterrorism agencies, my definition will incorporate components from the definitions of the 
U.S. Legal Code, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and Facebook.  
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  As American law ultimately (or ideally) determines the actions of counterterrorism 
agencies, I commence with definition of terrorism outlined by the U.S. Code § 2331 under 
Chapter 113b of Part II of Title 18. The legal code differentiates between international and 
domestic terrorism, but the characterization remains the same, except for the location of terrorist 
attacks. The law defines terrorism overall as violent acts that threaten human life and violate 
American federal or state criminal law codes (if they occurred domestically) or would violate 
those codes if they had occurred in the US (but occurred internationally). Through these 
activities, terrorists intend to terrorize civilian groups, dictate government actions or policies 
through terror, or alter government activity through mass destruction, kidnapping, or 
assassination (115 Stat. 376). The law code does not identify specific acts of terrorism other than 
assassinations, kidnapping, and mass destruction, nor does it outline the possible motivations for 
terrorists’ attempts to influence and threaten civilians and governments. Thus, this definition may 
not include all types of motivations, such as religious motivations (such as those of ISIS), 
political motivations (such as those of violent communist groups), or ethnic motivations (such as 
those of the Ku Klux Klan)  
The non-specific and broad nature of U.S. Code § 2331, while it provides a base for 
further definitions of terrorism, remains inadequate because it does not delineate which criminal 
actions and groups fall under the definition of terrorism or the potential motivations behind acts 
of terrorism. This lack of detail could permit certain perpetrators of particular acts of terrorism, 
such as violence that targets a specific ethnic group, to be punished only as general criminals. 
The classification as only a criminal undermines the threat that these individuals pose to 
domestic and international security. Even if the Legal Code included motivations for terrorism, 
violence to overthrow oppression might not apply, as the government may consider this excuse 
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as a legitimate reason for violence. However, as demonstrated by the differing definitions of 
terrorism by the FBI and DOS, even domestic government agencies cannot agree upon the 
motivations behind acts of terrorism (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism” and U.S., Dept. of 
State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Executive Order 13224”). 
 The FBI separates its delineation of terrorism into two definitions, one for international 
and one for domestic terrorism, that encompass a broad variety of crimes from disrupting the 
peace to mass shootings. The Bureau defines international terrorism as any violent act instigated 
by groups or individuals and encouraged by or connected to foreign terrorist networks or 
sponsored by foreign states (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism”). While the ideologies of 
these foreign entities provide the backdrop for these acts of terrorism, the violent incidents may 
occur abroad or in the United States. This definition would also include any violent actions 
committed by ISIS, al-Qaeda, their subgroups, similar terrorist networks, and those who declare 
allegiance to such organizations. The FBI does not specify which actions constitute terrorism 
(such as shootings, bombings, stabbings, or other forms of violence), the scale and severity of the 
acts of terrorism, and the locations of the attacks (such as whether they occur on public or private 
property). This definition also lacks an explanation for the motives behind these actions, though 
the political, racial, economic, social, cultural, and religious ideas espoused by foreign 
governments and foreign terrorist organizations that would likely explain such terrorist attacks.  
 The FBI specifies the definition of domestic terrorism more than its international 
counterpart. The Bureau characterizes domestic terrorism as violent actions instigated by 
American-based groups or individuals that hold extremist political, religious, social, racial, or 
environmental beliefs against any government or group of people (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, 
“Terrorism”). This classification includes the Ku Klux Klan (an extremist, whites-only group, 
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which attacked Americans of other ethnicities and races) and the May 19th Communist 
Organization (a violent anti-capitalist and anti-government group that attacked American 
civilians and property) (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, “CATHERINE” and “DONNA”). This 
definition, however, also includes individuals who possess no obvious connection to terrorist 
ideologies, actions, or groups. The FBI website’s “Most Wanted Terrorists” section lists 
criminals wanted for aiding and abetting, obstruction of justice, armed bank robbery and killings, 
and interference with interstate commerce by robbery, though the description of these people 
does not claim radical/ extremist inspirations or ideologies (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, 
“CHERI”). The reason for the broad conceptualization of domestic terrorism could result from 
the government’s desire to severely punish individuals who commit violence directly or 
indirectly against the United States government and civilians, whether they act as lone-wolves or 
as groups. However, this theory must remain as mere speculation without tangible proof from the 
individuals who created this definition.  
 The U.S. Department of State’s description of terrorism, while it does not differentiate 
between domestic and international terrorism, differentiates between foreign state-sponsored and 
non-state sponsored terrorism, per Executive Order 13224. This executive order, from which the 
DOS derives its definition of terrorism, prohibits the funding of foreign terrorist networks and 
individuals and identifies the characteristics necessary for the U.S. government to classify 
organizations and individuals as terrorists (as defined in section 140(b)(2) of the 1988 and 1989 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act). Unlike the FBI’s inclusion of domestic individuals and 
groups, one of Executive Order 13224’s stipulations requires that those entities identified as 
terrorists must be foreign. These agencies (as recognized by the Secretary of State in association 
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury) perpetrate, or run the risk or 
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perpetrating, terrorist actions that endanger the safety of American citizens, national security, 
foreign policy, or economy. The order continues on to define “terrorism” as activities which (1) 
include violence or endanger human life, infrastructure, or property and (2) seem to occur with 
the intent to terrorize or compel civilian groups; to interfere with government policy-making 
through fear and compulsion; or to disturb government business through murder, kidnapping, 
large-scale devastation, or “hostage-taking” (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, “Executive Order 13224”). Under this definition of “foreign terrorism,” the 
DOS published a list of foreign terrorist organizations on October 8, 1997 (before ex-President 
Bush signed Executive Order 13224) that the Department continues to update, which includes 
organizations such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ ISIS), Al Qaeda (al-Qaida), al-
Shabaab, Boko Haram, and their subgroups and regional branches (U.S., Dept. of State, Bureau 
of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”).  
 Facebook Inc., while a private company, defines terrorism through a similar lens to the 
DOS so that it can attempt to control the presence of terrorist individuals and groups on its social 
media sites (which include Facebook and Instagram). Unlike the DOS, Facebook classifies 
terrorism as existing both domestically and internationally, regardless of political and religious 
beliefs and the location of origin. The social media giant identifies groups, not individuals, on its 
site as terrorism threats if they perpetrate pre-determined violent acts against humans or against 
public and private property in order to terrorize civilian groups, international organizations, or 
governments to accomplish religious, ideological, or political goals. Since Facebook recognizes 
governments’ legal rights to a monopoly on violence in most cases, the company does not 
characterize governments as terrorists, though the site bans certain videos and photos that show 
state-sponsored violence per its “graphic violence policy.” The company sites its examples of 
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terrorist groups as those based upon white supremacy, religious extremism, violent separatism, 
and violent environmentalism (Bickert). Such delineations would include the Ku Klux Klan 
(white supremacy), ISIS/ ISIL (religious extremism), Palestinian Hamas (violent separatism), the 
Earth Liberation Front (violent environmentalism), and all related profiles, pages, and groups. 
Whether or not Facebook sends potentially useful information from such entities to international 
governments for terrorism prevention remains unclear through my research. Since the company 
possesses no legal, physical punitive authority, however, Facebook’s interests appear to lie in the 
elimination of terrorist content in order to protect its profits, which the company gains through 
investments by other companies.  
 Because my definition of terrorism aims to set the boundaries for data collection and 
analysis of terrorists’ Facebook pages and groups by American governmental counterterrorism 
agencies, I propose a new classification that both combines and broadens the definitions of the 
U.S. Legal Code, FBI, DOS, and Facebook. I characterize terrorism as any verifiable threat or 
act of violence against civilian and government populations and property committed by 
individuals or groups in order to promote extremist ideologies or prohibit other ideologies 
through the fear of future attacks. Terrorism may exist in both the United States and abroad, 
regardless of terrorist or terrorist group’s location of origin. A verifiable threat, in this case, 
signifies that the threat would likely become an action, as the person or group who makes the 
threat has a history of violent actions and thoughts and/or possesses ties to a terrorist 
organization. Violence in this definition of terrorism represents shootings, bombings, stabbings, 
or other types of destructive behavior that intentionally result in long-standing fear, injury, death, 
or property destruction. Per the delineation of terrorism by the DOS, this violence violates the 
right to life, liberty, security, and the pursuit of happiness (so long as this pursuit does not harm 
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others), as said acts of terrorism generally interrupt the flow of everyday life and the stability of 
countries, even if the acts do not involve human death or injury (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Executive Order 13224”). This willingness to resort to 
violence in order to forward various ideologies does not itself render these ideologies as 
“extremist” (115 Stat. 376). Extremism also involves an ideological and deep-seated hatred 
towards particular ethnic, religious, economic, political, or social groups that the individuals or 
groups holding such beliefs want radically changed or eliminated. 
 Under this definition of “terrorism,” all groups characterized by acts of violence 
(delineated above) because of extremist ideals may be classified as “terrorists,” as well as any 
individuals directly connected to and inspired to act violently by these groups. The most 
infamous groups (Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shabaab, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Boko Haram) would thus 
counts as terrorist networks, as would their sub-groups, regional branches, members, and similar 
groups. As is the case with the FBI and Facebook’s definition, my description would also include 
the Ku Klux Klan (because its violence against minorities due to a long-standing hatred of non-
whites and non-Protestants) and the May 19th Communist Organization (because of its violence 
against capitalist and democratic systems) (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism” and Bickert).  
My definition’s broad inclusion of who may count as a terrorist sets it apart from the 
definitions by the government and Facebook. Instead of delineating between international and 
domestic terrorism (like the U.S. government) or differentiating between groups and individuals 
(like Facebook), I provide one definition that considers both individuals and organizations to 
commit acts of terrorism anywhere in the world, regardless of the terrorists’ locations of origin. 
As demonstrated by the U.S. Code § 2331 and the FBI (but not by the DOS or Facebook), 
terrorism may occur in the U.S. and abroad, and the terrorist individuals or groups who 
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perpetrate terrorism may station themselves in America or internationally. However, I do not 
differentiate between domestic and international terrorism, as the U.S. Legal Code and the FBI 
do, because both types of terrorism encompass similar actions and intentions. I also define the 
reason for terrorism, extremist ideologies, and provide a description of the meaning of 
extremism. While the FBI and Facebook somewhat address this characteristic (though they do 
not define extremism), the U.S. Code § 2331 and the DOS do not. I consider the purpose behind 
terrorism important because the motivation behind terrorist threats or actions separate it from 
other cases of threats or acts of violence due to the desire to spread fear in a large population in 
order to achieve some sort of institutional or policy change. Without this inclusion, the 
government could apply terrorism to many more or many fewer criminal cases, causing undue 
punishment or a lack thereof. 
  
I.III Methodology and Outline 
 In this thesis I discuss the American government’s relation to terrorism and 
counterterrorism, and how the government can benefit from the collection of information from 
Facebook and Twitter, in order to create a solution that would allow the government to obtain 
such information. While the first chapter introduces the concept of terrorism, the second contains 
a discussion of the inefficacies of counterterrorism tactics in the United States that necessitates 
an additional strategy. I introduce the modern American history of counterterrorism that begins 
with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This information is necessary to understand the 
government’s motivation for high counterterrorism expenditures, as well as the wide variety of 
tactics employed and agencies involved. The devastation of 9/11 created a belief of “never 
again” in the government that today drives it to annually spend billions of dollars to combat 
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terrorism and to fund various strategies with arguable degrees of success (Nowrasteh). I begin 
with a discussion of the United States’ total counterterrorism budget, as this information 
highlights the importance that the government places on counterterrorism. I then discuss the 
functions of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), because the NCTC combines the 
efforts and intelligence of all the American counterterrorism agencies and plays a central role as 
the information distribution point in my policy. Chapter II does refer to other agencies, including 
the Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Defense, in terms 
of their general contributions to counterterrorism and the total budget of all of their strategies. 
Because I concentrate on the FBI and DOS in my classification of terrorism, I discuss their 
tactics in specific detail. I discuss the FBI, DOS, and DoD because their counterterrorism efforts 
cover those of other agencies. I use older information on the DoD’s tactics (from 2006) because 
many of the DoD’s current counterterrorism strategies remain classified, and I do not possess a 
security clearance to obtain said information (nor could I discuss classified information in this 
thesis). 
In the second major part of Chapter II, after the description of current counterterrorism 
methods, I present my literature review as a discussion of scholars’ views on the efficacy of 
American counterterrorism strategies. I analyze the tactics’ efficacies in terms of money spent 
versus success in preventing terrorism and their ethics in terms of civilian and infrastructural 
damage versus terrorism attacks prevented and lives saved. I address military drone strikes, as 
opposed to other specific military counterterrorism strategies, because of ethical problems that 
arise from the high death toll and infrastructural damage. The analysis demonstrates the necessity 
of new counterterrorism tactics, illustrating the importance of my method. 
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In the third chapter, I begin by discussing the specific benefits that Facebook and Twitter 
can provide to counterterrorism efforts in terms of the amounts and types of information that 
these social media sites contain. I focus on social media overall as an effective counterterrorism 
solution because of the wealth of data that users can instantaneously disseminate world-wide, 
such as their locations, interests, family, and friends. Because social media permits a rapid spread 
of information and an easy method to create new accounts, terrorist maintain a constant presence 
on social media (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism”). The American government already 
recognizes this threat and convicts suspected terrorists based on publicly-displayed content and 
tip-offs from other users (U.S., Dept of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office: District of New Mexico, 
“Two New Mexico Men”). Government agencies also currently collaborate and share sensitive 
information with social media companies for reasons other than counterterrorism, such as 
identifying threats from foreign governments (Breland). I use Facebook and Twitter specifically, 
as opposed to other sites like Snapchat and Instagram, because these sites directly target 
terrorism on their platforms (Steinbach). Twitter and Facebook also provide the most 
information available on terrorists, from detailed profile pages to special interest group 
participation. The sites also already collect data on their users, and American government could 
use terrorists’ data to identify, track, and arrest or extradite suspects and to prevent terrorist 
attacks (Domonoske and Geiger). The information that I use comes from articles and from an 
analysis of my personal pages so that I can identify all potentially available content and the uses 
for this content (though I do change my specific information for this thesis in order to protect my 
privacy). I then describe Facebook and Twitter’s moral and legal obligations, or lack thereof, to 
share information on terrorists with American counterterrorism agencies. 
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 After I discuss the benefits of Facebook and Twitter, I provide four case studies of 
terrorist groups which Facebook and Twitter have identified and repeatedly removed from social 
media. I include ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda as my examples because American 
journalism discourse about terrorism on social media focuses most on these organizations, the 
DOS identifies them as state-sponsored terrorist organizations, and they fit my definition of 
terrorism (Silver and Frier and U.S., Dept. of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations”). These four groups all use violent actions against civilian and 
government populations in order to achieve their objectives. I use these case studies to illustrate 
the pervasive and persistent existence of terrorists on social media and how Facebook and 
Twitter attempt, through their own methods, to prevent the spread of terrorism through their 
platforms. I discuss the problems that the social media companies face in the removal of these 
organizations to demonstrate that Twitter and Facebook do not effectively detect and remove 
terrorists’ information from the sites. 
 In the Chapter IV, I detail a counterterrorism policy proposal that would protect 
American counterterrorism agencies’ ability to use the information on terrorists collected from 
Facebook and Twitter. This policy would legally obligate the social media companies to share 
with the counterterrorism agencies the information that the companies gather on suspected 
terrorists. The identification of “terrorism” and “terrorists” would occur under my definition of 
terrorism so that the government and social media sites could more effectively coordinate their 
efforts. The policy would also allow the government to charge suspected terrorists based on their 
social media activity. After detailing the policy, I discuss its positive aspects for both the 
government and Facebook and Twitter. I then identify the potential downsides of the policy for 
the government and social media sites, including practical and ethical concerns. To conclude this 
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chapter, I work to negate these issues through a discussion of how the benefits of the policy and 
historical examples demonstrate why this policy should still be implemented.  
 In the concluding chapter, Chapter V, I summarize why the inefficacies of current 
American counterterrorism methods necessitate my new strategy. I then address possible points 
of expansion for my policy, such as by expanding the subject matter and online platforms 
covered and by allowing the government to take a more direct role in the identification and 
collection of terrorism information on social media. After discussing these expansion 
possibilities, I discuss some of the technical and ethical difficulties that they would face. If I 
expanded the policy to include sites such as YouTube, Snapchat, or Google, as well as Facebook 
and Twitter, the amount of data that counterterrorism agencies would need to monitor would 
increase infinitely. This growth of information would subsequently require a substantial increase 
in the government personnel necessary for analysis, which could reduce the cost-saving benefit 
of my policy. Ethical issues, especially concerning the privacy of personal information, would 
pose a much more severe problem if the government extended the policy in order to take a direct 
role in the monitoring, collection, and analysis of social media data than if Facebook and Twitter 
just passed along such information. These issues, I argue, caused me to limit my policy to its 
current point. To conclude, I speculate briefly on the future of counterterrorism in the United 
States and the impossibility of a final defeat of domestic and international terrorism. 
  
I.IV Moving Forward 
 This thesis serves as a policy proposal for a new counterterrorism method that American 
counterterrorism agencies could utilize in addition to current tactics. The policy would allow the 
government to legally obtain information on terrorists gathered by the security teams at 
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Facebook and Twitter and to then use this information to convict suspected terrorists. The goal of 
this policy is to eventually reduce the cost of current information gathering techniques by 
providing the government with data already collected by the social media sites, free of charge. 
Due to the detailed information contained on social media about each user, the government could 
also gain a more exact location estimate for suspected terrorists, which would permit it to more 
directly target terrorist strongholds, theoretically reducing the cost and civilian impact of current 
military counterterrorism strategies. While U.S. counterterrorism agencies may already utilize 
this technique, available research from the Edward Snowden leaks only indicates that the 
National Security Agency monitors and collects data from Facebook activity by exploiting the 
site’s technical weaknesses through project US – 984 BLARNEY (Greenwald 137-64). I 
therefore treat my thesis as a speculation and suggestion and must explain why current American 
counterterrorism tactics necessitate my new counterterrorism method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Chapter II: Conceptualizing Counterterrorism 
II.I 9/11: America’s Rude Awakening  
 On the morning of September 11, 2001, two hijacked commercial airplanes crashed into 
the World Trade Center in New York City. A further two hijacked plane attacks followed, with 
crashes into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 
American intelligence identified the terrorist group Al Qaeda as responsible for the organization 
and execution of this event. The devastation of the attacks left the world in a state of shock, and 
leaders from around the world, including Cuba and Russia, sent their condolences to the United 
States (U.S., White House Press Center, White House Briefing Room). While the crashes 
occurred on U.S. soil, the approximately 3,000 dead and missing victims represented over 80 
nations and prompted international support for what became officially known as the “Global War 
on Terrorism” (U.S., Dept. of State, The Coalition Information Centers). While the United States 
recognized and attempted to counteract terrorism before September 11, 2001, the shock and 
tragedy from that day heightened the government’s efforts. 
 Within the first 100 days, the American government’s strategy to rebuild the country and 
to thwart terrorism included seven tactics executed simultaneously: aiding survivors of the 
attacks, respecting Islam, homeland security, law enforcement, diplomacy, aid to Afghanistan, 
and military campaigns. To assist the victims and their families, the federal government donated 
around $52 million, on top of the approximately $1.3 billion raised by private organizations and 
companies. President Bush and his staff worked to demonstrate solidarity with Muslims across 
America and world-wide through meetings and events with Muslim-American communities and 
messages of solidarity and tolerance. As sporadic attacks in the following months also victimized 
Muslim and Sikh Americans, the government implemented several non-discrimination laws and 
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assisted local and state law enforcement in prosecuting perpetrators of hate-driven violence 
against individuals with Middle Eastern backgrounds. In addition to these efforts, the 
government donated money to aid in the rebuilding of disaster zones, for healthcare for displaced 
Americans, and for increased law enforcement, intelligence, and military efforts for an estimated 
cost of $20 billion. President Bush also created the Department of Homeland Security to 
coordinate information gathered by American intelligence agencies and to defend the country 
against future terrorist attacks. Outside of the United States, the federal government worked with 
foreign leaders to condemn and thwart acts of terrorism world-wide. After the first 100 days, 
America deployed under 3,000 troops to the Middle East, especially in Afghanistan, to seek out 
and destroy terrorist strongholds. The government also tasked these troops to deliver food, 
healthcare, and other forms of aid to Afghani civilians in order to counteract the destruction 
caused by terror attacks and American military tactics (U.S., Dept. of State, The Coalition 
Information Centers) 
 Since 9/11 the United States government has both expanded and modified its 
counterterrorism efforts due to changing technology and terrorism threats. The Department of 
State still relies mainly on diplomacy and humanitarian efforts in order to prevent the 
popularization of terrorism, to fight terrorism legislatively, and to contend with the destruction of 
terrorist attacks (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Global Counterterrorism 
Forum”). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security deal with 
law enforcement and intelligence to ensure internal security (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, 
“Terrorism”). The Department of Defense handles counterterrorism military campaigns world-
wide (U.S., Dept. of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 5-8). The Central Intelligence Agency uses all-source intelligence collection and covert 
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operations to target terrorists (U.S., CIA). All of the agencies depend on coordinated information 
and efforts in order to effectively counteract terrorism, which they conduct through the National 
Counterterrorism Center, created in 2003 under the name Terror Threat Integration Center, to 
allow for unrestricted access to intelligence (Wiley). Despite the many agencies involved in 
counterterrorism, the efficacy and ethics of the United States’ efforts since September 11, 2001 
remains contested by researchers and scholars. This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of current 
American counterterrorism strategies in order to promote the necessity of an additional, more 
effective tactic.  
 
II.II How the United States Government Combats Terrorism Post 9/11 
 Regardless of U.S. government agencies’ different definitions of terrorism, they each 
dedicate extensive amounts of time, money, and effort towards combatting terrorism. Because 
each government counterterrorism agency within America operates under a different definition 
of terrorism, the specific tactics which each agency uses tend to differ, though the strategies 
behind the tactics converge. A variety of agencies combat terrorism, including the CIA, FBI, 
DoD, DHS, DOS, NSA, NIMA, and OMB. Since each of these bureaus and departments 
contains several counterterrorism agencies, ranging from intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination to terrorism prevention and crisis responses to military actions overseas, I describe 
general counterterrorism practices and then focus on the strategies of the DOS, the FBI, and the 
DoD.  
The cost of counterterrorism programs remains difficult to calculate, as the U.S. 
government does not openly reveal its total (or, in certain cases, departmental) annual 
counterterrorism budget to members of the public. The best estimate for the Department of 
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State’s annual counterterrorism budget comes in the form of a testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on September 7, 2017 by Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism Nathan A. Sales. Ambassador Sales requests more than $288 million for DOS 
counterterrorism efforts in the 2018 Fiscal Year, which represents a steady increase from the 
budgets of 2016 and 2017 (Sales). Private governmental research institutes, such as 
DefenseNews, the Cato Institute, and the Stimson Center, estimate the total cost of 
counterterrorism efforts between 2002 and 2017 to equal $2.8 trillion, for a rough estimate of 
$150 billion to $186.6 billion per year (Belasco et al). In these fifteen years, the DoD spent $1.7 
trillion on emergency and overseas contingency operations, Homeland Security spent around 
$979 billion protecting American borders and the interior, the DOS/ USAID spent $138 billion 
on war-related costs, and other agencies spent $11 billion on non-OCO international aid (Mehta). 
While each agency involved in counterterrorism may work independently on specific 
strategies, counterterrorism agencies also collaborate by sharing information. In order to more 
effectively share information with other agencies involved in counterterrorism across the 
American government (the DOS, DoD, NSA, DHS, FBI, NIMA, OMB, and CIA), the Directors 
of Central Intelligence and the FBI, along with the Attorney General and the Secretaries of 
Defense and Homeland Security, created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) in 2003. 
The TTIC coordinated intelligence-sharing between all agencies involved in counterterrorism so 
that the involved agencies could prevent a higher number of terrorist attacks and otherwise 
disrupt the functions of terrorist networks. The most important elements of the TTIC included 
full and unedited access for the U.S. government to all intelligence gathered (whether completed 
or not), control of nation-wide counterterrorism tactics and a regulations organization system, 
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terrorist threat assessments based on intelligence gathered from all involved agencies available to 
government heads, and upkeep of a database containing certified and potential terrorists open to 
all federal, and particular non-federal, leaders and agencies. Individuals spanning the public and 
private sectors debated whether the TTIC achieved its intended goal of intelligence-sharing, but 
the lack of a coordination center pre-9/11 necessitated some form of cohesion to prevent such 
devastating terrorist attacks in the future (Wiley). In August 2004, under Executive Order 13354, 
the TTIC became the National Counterterrorism Center and eventually expanded its functions to 
include 20 different agencies with functions including mission management, information 
analysis and dissemination, and terrorism database maintenance. Given the NCTC’s relative 
autonomy from other government sectors and its access to domestic and international terrorism 
data, the Center can avoid many concerns of other counterterrorism agencies (such as influences 
from the Legislature) and can more efficiently gather information (United States, Office of the 
Director of Natl. Intelligence, Natl. Counterterrorism Center). 
The Department of State actively concerns itself with international affairs and terrorism. 
Hence, the DOS participates highly in public transnational counterterrorism efforts. The Global 
Counterterrorism Forum, a program which started in 2011 and involves 30 countries, devotes 
itself to categorizing the counterterrorism needs of civilians, coordinating the knowledge and 
products to tackle those needs, and increasing international collaboration. The GCTF works to 
counter terrorism at the global civilian level by donating money towards community-building 
and the development of stable legal and political systems in areas where terrorism is particularly 
potent, supporting victims of terrorist attacks and establishing organizations to prosecute or 
rehabilitate (if possible) offenders, and educating on and implementing civilian-led groups to 
counter violent extremism (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Global 
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Counterterrorism Forum”). The DOS also participates in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, 
inspired by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170, which promotes the 
cooperation of all states as necessary to counteract terrorism. America (through the DOS) 
actively participates in this coalition and encourages all states to support the cause in any way 
possible, including military efforts, humanitarian support, defunding ISIS, preventing the influx 
of fighters, and exposing ISIS’ atrocities (U.S, Dept. of State, “The Global Coalition”). Both the 
GCFT and the coalition fall under the DOS’s Bureau of Counterterrorism. These programs and 
initiatives require collaborations with other countries and their counterterrorism organizations in 
order to function effectively.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, though relevant international information and 
intelligence remains crucial to its efficiency, concentrates on counterterrorism efforts as they 
affect the United States. Thus, the FBI monitors both domestic and foreign terrorist individuals 
and groups that are known or suspected threats to the security and functioning of America and 
works to combat terrorism threats in the nation as its priority. Because of the ever-rising 
popularity of technology and the internet, counterterrorism efforts increasingly target the 
internet, social media, and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs). Terrorist individuals and 
networks recognize the potential of the internet and social media to gain new recruits world-
wide, to plan attacks, and to spread information and extremist ideologies. To combat these 
threats, the Bureau utilizes a variety of strategies, including intelligence gathering and analysis, 
collaboration with other (unspecified) entities, surveillance of suspected and known terrorists, 
and the promotion of national community preparedness and information sharing (U.S., Dept. of 
Justice, FBI, “Terrorism”). The FBI also works vertically through its Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces, coordinating counterterrorism information and efforts with security partners on a local, 
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state, and federal level (Schiff and Heimbach). As the FBI uses various classified missions and 
methods in its fight against terrorism, the extent of its technology and capabilities remains 
unknown to the public, especially modern tactics involving the minimization of terrorism threats 
on social media.  
Like the FBI, the Department of Defense also utilizes classified technologies and 
strategies in its counterterrorism activities, but the DoD covers the military side of 
counterterrorism. The DoD’s counterterrorism strategy contains three main elements: to protect 
and defend the United States, to provide support to Muslims that attempt to resist extremism, and 
to target terrorists and their ability to function domestically and internationally. The tactics used 
to achieve these goals occur both directly and indirectly, with direct strategies concentrating on 
American interests while targeting terrorists and indirect strategies focusing on the promotion of 
counterterrorism success by non-American entities (U.S., Dept. of Defense, Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 5-6). Direct tactics undertaken against 
identified terrorist networks include the destruction of safe-havens, resources, and training 
camps; the capturing or killing of foot soldiers, senior leadership, and senior operatives; and the 
interruption of recruitment and training efforts. Indirect efforts comprise the provision of 
security, humanitarian aid, military-to-military contacts, conduct of operations, and military 
information operations to assist civilians and counterterrorism groups in areas of pervasive 
terrorist activity (24-7). The Department attempts to coordinate all information and tactics with 
both domestic and international governmental partners in order to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of its counterterrorism methods, but it operates alone when necessary. Whether the 
money spent by the Department of Defense and the U.S. government on counterterrorism 
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measures effectively achieves its goals, however, remains contested by counterterrorism scholars 
and researchers. 
  
II.III Literature Review: American Counterterrorism Strategies and Efficacy 
 Opinions on the efficacy of American governmental counterterrorism efforts and 
spending vary based upon the position of the analysts and upon their biases and reasons for said 
analysis. A Cato Institute researcher, Alex Nowrasteh, analyzes general U.S. counterterrorism 
expenditures (both domestically and internationally), which he deems inefficient. Nowrasteh 
posits that, to be effective, the $2.8 trillion spent on counterterrorism since 9/11 would have to 
have saved a total of 188,740 lives since 9/11, or 11,796 per year (given a hypothetical value on 
life at $6.5 million and a budget of $13 million to save that life).1 From 2002 to 2017, Nowrasteh 
estimates that only 174 civilians died on American soil as a result of terrorist attacks. Thus, 
American counterterrorism tactics would have to have saved 1,074 times as many lives if the 
total counterterrorism budget were truly effective (Nowrasteh). Nowrasteh’s research implies 
that the inefficient and ineffective use of counterterrorism funds harms lives instead of saving 
them, as civilians could die from other forms of homicide. This study indicates that American 
counterterrorism practices, including intelligence, military tactics, security checkpoints, and 
counterterrorism education suffer from strong inefficacy levels. In order to justify its high 
counterterrorism budget, the government must consider a redistribution of its funds and the use 
of more effective counterterrorism techniques.  
Counterterrorism scholar John Mueller focuses on an analysis of the FBI’s overall 
counterterrorism spending, particularly in terms of chasing suspected terrorists, instead of on the 
                                                          
1 Nowrasteh does not address his methodology for these estimates and only indicates that he chooses a value in the 
millions because of an assumption that people highly value human life. 
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efficacy and ethics of specific strategies. According to Mueller’s estimates, the FBI spends $3 
billion a year tracing 10-20 million (mostly false) terrorist leads. Other than the Florida nightclub 
shooting in 2016, only around 6 people in the U.S. die annually because of domestic terrorist 
attacks. Mueller argues that these attacks (which do not include school shootings or public 
shootings not related to terrorism) do not warrant a budget as high as $3 billion, especially when 
the FBI could focus more heavily on drug cartel activity in the U.S. (Mueller). Given that more 
than half of this budget does not counter verified acts or threats of terrorism (and instead goes 
towards the chasing of false or dead-end leads), the inefficiency rate of current FBI seems high, 
insinuating that the agency should look further into more efficient methods for verifying leads 
and threats and for tracking leads. As much of the FBI’s activities and data remain classified, and 
John Mueller does not state whether he uses public or classified information, his estimates may 
not represent the true efficacy of FBI tactics. The FBI may stop more potential terrorist attacks 
and save more lives through top-secret intelligence tactics that warrant a high counterterrorism 
budget.   
 Another analysis performed by John Mueller, in conjunction with Mark G. Stewart, 
indicates high inefficacies in American domestic counterterrorism intelligence. The researchers 
measure the efficiency of strategies versus the counterterrorism intelligence budget in terms of 
the costs of tactics, the reduction rate of attack risks due to the tactics, the chance of a successful 
terrorist attack, and the cost of a successful attack. Though Mueller and Stewart admit that the 
results of their research change if they place more weight on deaths from terrorist attacks than 
those by other dangers, given that only 54 Islamist-related terrorist attacks occurred after 
September 11, 2001 to 2014, the total cost of damage (including human lives, infrastructure 
damage, and economic disruption) would only equal about $500 million. As compared to the 
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(conservative) $75 billion estimate that Mueller and Stewart use as their budget example for 
counterterrorism intelligence, this discrepancy reveals that the cost of preventing verified acts of 
terrorism does not warrant such high expenditures (Mueller and Stewart 237-248).  The 
differences in costs also indicate that the involved agencies use most of these funds for strategies 
with variable degrees of success and for following dead-end or false potential terrorist leads. If 
counterterrorism agencies spend such a high amount of money on costly and fruitless ventures, 
they lack the ability and the tools to verify the credibility of terrorism threats and leads. This 
research study could lack in the knowledge of top-secret government practices and thwarted 
terrorist attacks (and the extent of government secrecy remains largely unknown); however, 
given the information available, counterterrorism intelligence practices appear to suffer from 
high inefficiencies.  
 Instead of analyzing cost as a measure of effectiveness, researcher Michael J. Boyle 
concentrates specifically on the efficacy and ethics of drone strikes as a means of 
counterterrorism. While U.S. government officials under the Obama administration praised the 
accuracy of drone strikes, arguing that they targeted terrorist groups and not civilian populations, 
Boyle counters that these proclamations do not accurately represent current research data on 
drone strikes. According to Boyle, both critics and proponents of drone strikes cite different data 
sets (from NGO or government reports) about casualty types (terrorist or civilian) from drone 
strikes, but neither side truly knows the full extent of casualties, as the American government 
either does not collect such information or will not reveal it. The government also practices guilt-
by-association and defines individuals as “militants” or “terrorists” without much evidence. This 
strategy of committing drone strikes with little information equates to the targeting of possibly 
innocent civilian populations, leading to mass fear, injury, death, and destruction (Boyle 3-8).  
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Regardless of the number of civilian casualties, American drone strikes cause fear in the 
general public of the targeted countries and result in anti-American and anti-Western sentiment. 
These ideas, in turn, can result in higher recruitment for groups like Al-Qaeda, which the drones 
initially intended to kill and disrupt, making it one of the most ethically costly American 
counterterrorism efforts (14-21). From Boyle’s analysis, the cost of human death and 
infrastructure damage may equate to a higher price than that of the drone strike itself, but 
comprehensive estimations remain impossible to determine without data collection efforts. 
However, drone strikes seem to be the most psychologically and physically damaging of 
counterterrorism efforts to civilians, based on the impact on the populations affected by drone 
strikes. The unintended consequences caused by the aftermath of drone strikes, including the 
increased support and recruitment for terrorist groups and the anti-American beliefs, could 
necessitate a higher counterterrorism expenditure by the U.S. government in the future. If 
counterterrorism does necessitate violence on some level, this information indicates that relevant 
agencies must develop tactics that directly target known terrorist locations and that minimize 
attacks on civilians and infrastructure. Otherwise, the American government will continue to 
create more enemies and feed the growth of terrorism. 
 
II.IV Necessary Changes 
 The American government has continued to increase its counterterrorism efforts and 
budget in the years since 9/11. The total counterterrorism budget now ranges in the trillions of 
dollars and covers at least a half-dozen agencies. The DoD, DOS, DHS, FBI, NIMA, OMB, 
NSA, and CIA each include counterterrorism agencies that employ a wide array of strategies. 
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The tactics of these agencies cover intelligence, military, diplomacy, terrorism and 
counterterrorism education, and peace-building strategies in the United States and world-wide.  
 Though the American government publicly promotes the effectiveness of its 
counterterrorism actions, various international organizations and scholars criticize the fiscal and 
ethical cost of such practices. Certain critiques involve the financial cost of these efforts as 
compared to their success rates. Other American counterterrorism practices, such as drone 
strikes, face heavy international criticism surrounding their ethical viability, as they result in high 
human casualties, resource loss, and infrastructural damage. Despite the lack of government 
transparency regarding its counterterrorism budget and successes, scholarly analysis of various 
counterterrorism actions versus lives saved and terrorist attacks thwarted reveals a large 
discrepancy of funds that could be spent on preventing other violent crimes (such as drug wars or 
human trafficking). While the general public may find such high spending necessary, regardless 
of the authenticity or accuracy counterterrorism efforts, U.S. counterterrorism agencies need to 
streamline their efforts and to create a cheaper, more efficient, and more effective system 
through which to track terrorists and thwart their attacks. This new method would work in 
conjunction with current strategies to reduce the amount of money spent and lives lost as a result 
of American counterterrorism actions, which would thus increase terrorism prevention world-
wide. 
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Chapter III: Facebook, Twitter, and Counterterrorism 
III.I Current Efforts 
 Like the United States government, Facebook and Twitter also acknowledge the threat of 
terrorism on their platforms. As of 2018 Facebook’s counterterrorism team included around 200 
employees, who daily monitor and delete new and old terrorist content that the site’s algorithm 
technology detects. While the company’s detection tools do not catch all instances of terrorism 
content, Facebook officials claim that they modify these tools each time in order to keep up with 
the changing nature of terrorists’ posts and accounts. The social media company announced that, 
in the first fiscal quarter of 2018, it managed to remove around 1.9 million pieces of information 
from ISIS and Al Qaeda. 99% of the terrorism content removed in the same quarter was, 
according to the same report, identified by Facebook’s detection technology and not by other 
users (Bickert and Fishman). The counterterrorism security team did not announce what percent 
of total terrorist content these 1.9 million content pieces represent, perhaps because of the 
difficulty even roughly estimating the total terrorist content due to the breadth of information 
stored on Facebook.  
 Twitter also uses technological tools to identify and eliminate terrorism content on its 
platform. In the report “Twitter Rules enforcement – January to June 2018,” Twitter announced 
that it suspended 205,156 accounts for incidents related to the promotion of terrorism. According 
to the study, Twitter’s technology identified 91% of these cases, with the remaining 8% reported 
by other users, including U.S. and foreign government accounts. The report acknowledged that 
the suspension of accounts in this period represented a 25% decrease from the last study period, 
but the company correlated the reduction to the increased efficacy of its tools (“Twitter Rules 
enforcement”). Twitter did not discuss whether its content review teams include a specific subset 
29 
 
for terrorism content (included under the company’s “Violent Threats Policies”), nor did the site 
identify whether it modifies detection tools based upon missed threats. Despite these 
uncertainties, Twitter does appear on the surface to enjoy relative success in discovering and 
deleting terrorism information.  
Regardless of the companies’ successes, news sources and private studies from groups 
such as WIRED and the Digital Citizens Alliance reveal that terrorist content still maintains a 
firm hold on Facebook and Twitter. To remove all instances of terrorism information from any 
online site remains impossible, but critics argue that these social media companies’ do not 
expend enough time, money, and technology to cause a significant difference (Macdonald). But 
what if Facebook and Twitter worked directly with American counterterrorism agencies to defeat 
these terrorists on social media? The chapter addresses the types of information which the 
government could obtain on social media from terrorist groups. This chapter identifies four cases 
of well-known terrorist organizations on Facebook and Twitter, Al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah, in order to identify their persistent nature on social media and the sites’ inability (and 
possible refusal) to remove them completely, which necessitates government intervention due to 
the threat that these groups pose to civilians. I argue that, if Facebook and Twitter freely shared 
information with U.S. counterterrorism agencies, the government could more easily identify and 
target these terrorists, which would thus save the social media sites from having to continuously 
remove content from these same individuals. 
 
III.II The Benefits of Facebook 
 If Facebook did share identified terrorists’ information with governments, what types of 
data could American counterterrorism agencies obtain? Facebook’s settings permit privacy for 
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most information. The possible settings include “public,” “friends of friends,” “friends,” or “only 
me” options in terms of which users can view individual and group account data. Even if a user 
or group selects “only me” for all possible privacy options, a few pieces of information remain 
public, which counterterrorism agencies can use regardless of whether Facebook shares 
information: the name of individuals and group members, all profile pictures, and all cover 
photos. If the pictures include people, counterterrorism agencies can perform facial recognition 
analysis. Counterterrorism agencies need to identify the appearances of terrorists in order to 
determine their exact locations. These individuals, however, could change their appearances in 
order to evade capture by the government. Facebook already, if unintentionally, covers this 
problem. The company uses advanced facial recognition tools, which can allow users to tag their 
friends in photos based on Facebook’s suggestions. If users chose not to tag their friends, 
Facebook’s facial recognition still stores the names and faces of individuals. The site’s 
technology analyzes facial features in photos in order to connect faces with names. The new tool 
can also alert users if someone tries to impersonate him or her through photos (Domonoske). 
Though the efficacy of this technology remains unknown, Facebook could use facial recognition 
on accounts that it links to terrorism. This facial recognition technology could thus permit 
counterterrorism agencies to identify the faces of terrorists without searching for and analyzing 
photos themselves. This information would also allow agencies to recognize terrorists face-to-
face or in other forms of media, potentially facilitating location identification. 
 Another crucial information from publicly-available account content on Facebook can 
also derive from photographs: location. Some photographs may originate from photoshop or 
from online stock photos, but other photographs (especially ones in which Facebook facial 
recognition connects the individual in the photo to the account owner) may alert the government 
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to current or past locations. Even if a user does not specify a location in his or her posted image, 
counterterrorism agencies may recognize certain architectural and natural features (such as the 
Eiffel Tower or Niagara Falls) and thus can track the potential current location or past location 
patterns of a suspected terrorist. If the user uploads a picture from his or her phone, the photo 
comes with a publicly-available geo-tag (marker of the location in which the photo was taken) 
that counterterrorism agencies could also use to determine a user’s location. If given full access 
to terrorists’ Facebook data, the government could also identify locations from other posts either 
created by the users or by friends who “tagged” the users. Besides the location of a user’s posts, 
he or she may also include places in which they live, work, and study either currently or in the 
past. All content posted to Facebook, whether public of private, also includes the date and time at 
which the user shared the material. In combination with the location of the post, the date and 
time can increase American counterterrorism agencies’ potential to triangulate the current and 
past whereabouts of terrorists (Dewicki).  
 The full content of individual accounts on Facebook ranges from background information 
to personal interests to friends. The background information may comprise of the user’s birthday, 
age, gender, a short biography, his or her email addresses and phone numbers, languages spoken, 
the relationship status, sexuality, and family members (Dewicki). Facebook even frequently 
stores information that users do not self-report, such as email addresses and phone numbers on 
individuals without Facebook accounts but whose contacts have accounts (a phenomenon called 
“shadow profiles”) (Hatmaker). Counterterrorism agencies can utilize this content to gain 
background knowledge on an individual and to find possible points of contact with the individual 
through email, phone number, or family members. Some of the personal interests that users can 
post on their personal accounts include movies and television series, celebrities, sports, activities, 
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and groups (both in real life and on Facebook) in which the individual either participates or 
enjoys. Photos, videos, and other content posted by users can verify and add to this information 
(Dewicki). Users can of course lie about this information, but if Facebook and/or the government 
could verify the validity of the content, these interests could assist American counterterrorism 
agencies in determining whether an individual poses a verifiable threat to national security (see 
I.II for a classification of a “verifiable threat”). If a user hypothetically “likes” many pages and 
celebrities who promote violence or hatred against specific populations, given that this 
information proves true, that person could present a terrorism threat to the United States and 
other countries. 
The list of a user’s friends can also connect the individual to other potential or confirmed 
terrorists. Given open access to users’ friends lists, the government can identify all of the 
individuals’ Facebook friends, who follows the users’ accounts, and whose accounts the users 
follow (Dewicki). In analyzing a potential terrorist’s list of friends, a counterterrorism agent may 
discover connections to suspected terrorists, which would increase the likelihood that the 
individual is a terrorist. Psychologist Dr. John Horgan at Pennsylvania State University’s 
International Center for the Study of Terrorism found in his study of 60 former terrorists that 
terrorists with familial or friendship ties to terrorist sympathizers indicated an openness to 
terrorist recruitment and radicalization (DeAngelis). If these individuals possess Facebook 
accounts, they likely follow these friends and family members, identified on the suspects’ friends 
lists.  
 Group accounts on Facebook provide much of the same basic public information as 
individual accounts. The name of the group and its profile and cover images always remain 
public, as do the names of administrators and members (“Overheard”). Thus, counterterrorism 
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agencies can perform facial recognition and location/ date identification analyses on at least a 
group’s public information (if Facebook does not give them access to private information). The 
public information for Facebook groups also lists all of the group members and group 
administrators (“Overheard”). With full access to private group information (which includes 
activities such as content posting and sharing), the government can identify other individuals 
who may create a security threat, especially if these individuals often actively participate in these 
groups.  
While joining a terrorist group on social media does not necessarily mean that an 
individual is a terrorist, as the user could work as an undercover agent or journalist, a high rate of 
activity within the group could signify an individual’s interest in terrorism. The more actively a 
person participates in activities that spread extremist messages and terrorist content, the more 
likely that person presents a terror threat. According to police units from the United Kingdom, 
signs of possible online terrorist activity include the posting of content that promotes racial and 
religious hatred or violence, praises terrorists and violent terrorist activities, encourages 
individuals to commit acts of terrorism or violent extremism, or instructs on the creation of 
bombs (“Action Counters Terrorism” and “Signs of Possible Terrorist Activity”). Even if the 
group does not represent a threat or a terrorist organization, the Facebook interface often 
provides users with suggested “related groups” that may interest the user (“Overheard”). These 
similar groups may pose veritable threats. Assuming that Facebook security software already 
scans individuals, groups, and content related to terrorism and shares that information with 
American counterterrorism agencies, the agencies could obtain this information from Facebook 
without scanning for it themselves.  
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III.III The Benefits of Twitter 
 In terms of permanently publicly-available content, Twitter provides much of the same 
information as Facebook. An account with all privacy settings turned on shows only the user’s 
account name, current profile and cover photos, Twitter handle (“@...”), and the month and year 
joined (@dew_mari). Thus, assuming the user uploads a real photograph of him or herself in a 
real location, counterterrorism agencies can still perform facial and location recognition 
analyses, regardless of whether Twitter shares the individual’s full account information. The 
images on a “fully” private account on Twitter do not, however, include the location, day, and 
time at which user uploaded the cover and profile images. Past versions of these images remain 
hidden as well, rendering location patterns difficult to analyze unless the government receives 
full access to all content from a user’s account. If Twitter granted U.S. counterterrorism agencies 
full access to suspected terrorists’ accounts, the agencies could view all photographs and videos 
uploaded, as the day and time of the upload, and the location at which the users captures that 
media or at which they posted the content (@dew_mari). This content would allow agencies to 
analyze location and facial recognition patterns so that the government could identify a suspected 
terrorist in other media content or in real life and could determine the suspect’s potential 
location.  
 The Twitter interface also allows for the upload of personal information similar to that of 
Facebook. A users’ account may include his or her biography, birthday, age, gender, languages 
spoken, current location/ time-zone, email addresses, and phone numbers (@dew_mari). This 
information can also provide counterterrorism agencies with background knowledge on possible 
terrorists and with potential points of contact through email and phone. These agencies could 
also connect to suspects through the individuals’ families and friends, included in users’ 
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“contacts” section with their names and relationships to users (@dew_mari). Families and 
friends, as well as a users’ followers and accounts they follow, may also provide an 
understanding of the types of people with whom the users interact. For example, if the 
government discovers that a user’s family members, friends, and followers possess connections 
to terrorist organizations, the user may be a terrorist. This likelihood may increase if that same 
user’s “interests” section or posting activity also demonstrate an interest in organizations, ideas, 
activities, and famous people (politicians, celebrities, etc.) who support or are connected to 
terrorism or terrorist activities. Users can of course easily falsify all of this information, but, if 
the content represents the truth, this information can provide data crucial to identify and track 
suspected terrorists. The ability of American counterterrorism agencies to obtain and analyze 
such data, however, depends on the willingness of Twitter to share it. And, despite the fact that 
terrorists pose a continuous problem for both Twitter’s and Facebook’s reputations and security 
teams, both companies appear reluctant to involve government assistance. 
 
III.IV Case Study 1: Al Qaeda 
 While the exact date of Al Qaeda’s emergence on Facebook and Twitter remains 
unknown, this group has maintained a presence on the sites since around 2009. At this time the 
terrorist group al-Shabab, working on behalf of Al Qaeda, updated its Facebook and Twitter 
followers on a failed French attempt to rescue a hostage by posting pictures of a uniform and 
alleging that the group had killed a French soldier. Later posts by Al Qaeda and its subsidiary 
groups from 2009 to 2013 continued along a different propaganda trend, including pictures and 
videos of members from the Jabhat al-Nusra group that demonstrated its “humanitarian” side by 
moving civilians out of lines of fire during battles and delivering aid. Facebook began to remove 
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some of this content around 2013, but Al Qaeda and its sub-groups continued to post content and 
recruit followers (Prucha and Fisher 18-23). In a 2015 testimony before the U.S. Senate, Peter 
Bergen, a director at the New America Foundation and professor at Arizona State University, 
found 62 Americans whom Al Qaeda and similar groups recruited on social media. From these 
62 individuals, Bergan discovered that terrorist network mostly targeted vulnerable populations, 
especially teenagers and young adults, of every ethnicity and gender. The propaganda posted by 
terrorist groups on social media likely inspired these individuals, as Bergan’s study proved that 
53 of the 62 individuals actively used social media to download and share jihadi content (U.S., 
Cong., Senate, Comm. on Homeland Security and Govt. Affairs 4-5). 
Twitter and Facebook do attempt to remove the content and pages on their platforms that 
Al Qaeda uses to promote its cause and inspire civilians to join. In 2014 Twitter started to 
suspend accounts related to Al Qaeda, but these groups again created new accounts. Around that 
time the terrorist organization also employed the use of “bots” (accounts controlled by 
computers) to continuously develop new accounts after Twitter deleted others. The use of these 
bots results in difficulty for Twitter’s security technology to identify and remove all information 
pertaining to Al Qaeda (Berger). A 2018 article by WIRED reported that, as of that year, content 
and accounts by Al Qaeda maintained a presence on social media, regardless of these companies’ 
increased efforts to detect and delete related data (Lapowsky).  
 Despite the difficulty in completely eliminating the Al Qaeda’s presence on Twitter and 
Facebook, private research studies indicate that these companies could take more steps to prevent 
this content from avoiding detection and continuing to flourish. J.M. Berger, a former research 
expert at The Brookings Institution, argued that social media companies needed more 
transparency in terms of their policies on account suspension and that the companies’ criteria and 
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rate for terrorism content detection and removal needed to remain consistent. A constant change 
in Twitter’s and Facebook’s identification and suspension techniques or a pause in this process 
could allow terrorists to regrow their social media networks and make them more difficult to 
manage (Berger). A 2018 report by the non-profit organization Digital Citizens Alliance posed a 
similar argument to Berger and added that a lack of legal and moral incentives perhaps prevented 
Facebook and Twitter from devoting as many resources to combatting terrorism on their sites as 
their extensive resources would allow (“Fool Me”). The report did not address methods or 
resources that social media companies could use to combat terrorism, but consulting with other 
companies or governments combatting online terrorism could prove useful. 
 
III.V Case Study 2: ISIS 
 Despite other terrorist organizations active presence on social media, ISIS’ social media 
activity remains the most pervasive. In a 2016 testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, FBI official Michael Steinbach identified ISIS as the greatest terrorism threat on 
social media. The group uses sites like Facebook and Twitter to recruit and communicate with 
supporters and to announce its ideologies and activities. Because of the global presence of social 
media and the rapid rate of communication (especially on social media messaging applications), 
this terrorist organization has successfully recruited hundreds of individuals from the United 
States alone, some of whom travelled to strongholds in the Middle East to actively join. Mubin 
Shaikh, a former Canadian jihadi advocate and current Canadian government employee, spends 
much of his time on Twitter in an attempt to counteract these recruitments. Shaikh claims that 
ISIS recruits both males and females of varying ages. In one instance Shaikh successfully 
intervened in the attempted recruitment of an American girl that the terrorist organization 
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attempted to lure. His statement in a May 7, 2015 hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs proves that ISIS targets a variety of ages and 
genders on social media, including vulnerable youth, which may necessitate government 
intervention for the protection of civilians at risk of recruitment (U.S., Cong., Senate, Comm. on 
Homeland Security and Govt. Affairs 9-11) 
ISIS’ advocacy of violence, which the group posts on social media, poses another 
terrorism threat. The organization urges individuals across the world to take up arms and to 
attack, which caused several attacks and near-attacks in the United States and Europe in 2016 
(Steinbach). The content that Facebook and Twitter do not detect contains messages along these 
lines, often including violent content. A report by WIRED Magazine in May 2018 analyzed 
several studies and concluded that Facebook and Twitter might not detect much of the terrorism 
content on their sites. Photographs and videos that promote anti-Western sentiments and show 
acts of violence still exist undetected and easily searched on social media. Researchers from the 
Global Intellectual Property Enforcement Center (GIPEC) and the Digital Citizens Alliance 
discovered a multitude of accounts still present on Facebook through chasing hashtags and 
keywords in Arabic and English. While Facebook may have deleted the content of these 
accounts, the site did not delete the accounts themselves (possibly because the accounts do not 
all post violent content), which permits terrorists to post more information. This content also 
continues to exist because Facebook algorithms mainly search related account clusters, which 
allows others to avoid detection (Lapowsky). Facebook detection technology scans for accounts 
with similar names or groups with connections through group members and administrators. Thus, 
Facebook’s security systems often do not detect pages with names not included in these clusters 
and groups who contain different members and administrators than the account clusters. 
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The data pertaining to ISIS that the social media sites do discover also poses its own 
problems to civilians and to government counterterrorism efforts world-wide. No laws exist that 
would require Facebook and Twitter to share their stored information with the United States 
government unless agencies directly request the information through legal processes. Even when 
counterterrorism agencies request such data, social media sites may have deleted the content 
(though not the accounts) permanently from all storage platforms (Steinbach). This deleted 
content could prove crucial to counterterrorism efforts, from possible locations of terrorists and 
terrorist strongholds to planned terrorist attacks. As the social media companies possess no legal 
obligation to disseminate or store the information that they detect on terrorists, however, 
American counterterrorism agencies continue to lose a potential wealth of information.  
  
III.VI Case Study 3: Hamas 
 Hamas’ use of social media creates a different issue than that of Al Qaeda and ISIS. 
Certain governments identify Hamas as a terrorist group, and others (especially Muslim-majority 
countries in the Middle East) recognize it as a legally-elected Palestinian political party or a 
group of “freedom fighters” that fights for Palestinian legal rights. The United States and certain 
allies may not distinguish Hamas as a legal ruling entity, but Palestinians in Israel’s Gaza Strip 
elected this political party as a pseudo-governing entity. The fact that Hamas uses tactics such as 
suicide bombings and missile strikes against Israeli civilians causes Israel (and, thus, its 
American ally) to consider the group as a terrorist organization (Davidson). Facebook and 
Twitter, per their policies, may also not frame Hamas as a terrorist organization and thus may not 
focus their security sensors on Hamas’ accounts and content. The fact that Facebook and Twitter 
focus their detection tools on Al Qaeda and ISIS may also explain why Hamas remains largely 
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active on the sites. Posts by this group serve as a virtual “war” between Hamas and Israel. Hamas 
simultaneously shares content that shows the violence of Israeli troops against Palestinian 
civilians in order to gain international sympathy and content that shows the group kidnapping 
and killing Israeli soldiers in order to demonstrate the country’s “weakness” (Patrikarakos).  
Unlike Al Qaeda and ISIS, Facebook and Twitter barely target and remove content and 
propaganda posted by Hamas. Only after the Israeli government sent a letter in 2018 that 
threatened legal action against the companies did Facebook and Twitter remove content from 
Hamas in early 2018 (Carbone). Twitter suspended about twenty accounts related to Hamas after 
the Israeli Ministry Justice Cybercrime Department threatened to take legal action against the 
company (Middle East Monitor). Other than the few removed accounts, Facebook and Twitter 
generally remain popular spots for Hamas to spread propaganda and garner sympathy 
(Patrikarakos). Research into statements by Facebook and Twitter does not indicate if these 
companies consider Hamas as a terrorist organization and treat its content in the same way that 
they do for Al Qaeda and Hamas. Personal searches for Hamas on Facebook and Twitter, 
however, demonstrate that the group continues to post content under pages of its name. If threats 
of legal measures by governments primarily cause the social media companies to remove content 
by Hamas, then governmental laws requiring the companies to do so may present an effective 
solution. 
 
III.VII Case Study 4: Hezbollah/ Al-Manar 
 Like Hamas, Hezbollah’s presence on social media remains contentious because, while 
some foreign governments may recognize it as a terrorist organization, other governing entities 
consider Hezbollah as a legal governing party. Despite its history of violent and anti-Western 
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actions, the political party and militant group gained its power in the Lebanese government from 
the 1990s to 2000s through legal elections (Masters and Laub). Hezbollah and its media outlet, 
Al-Manar, use social media to spread messages of terrorism. Al-Manar specifically promotes 
violence against Americans and other troops in the Middle East, the implementation of Sharia 
Law, and suicide attacks (Grabinsky and Jorisch).  
Facebook and Twitter treat Hezbollah content and pages in much the same way as they 
do for Hamas. Facebook did remove some pages related to Hezbollah’s Al-Manar, Al-Ahed, and 
the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, but the groups quickly reemerged. Facebook also eliminated 
one of Al-Manar’s pages in 2018, but searches by Bloomberg Businessweek found replacements 
within two weeks (Silver and Frier). Twitter suspended Hezbollah’s main pages around the same 
time in 2018, but officials from the organization directed followers to other pages. Twitter’s 
actions against Hezbollah likely resulted from the same threats by Israeli officials that caused the 
removal of several of Hamas’ accounts (Carbone). The problem with Hezbollah’s existence on 
Twitter and Facebook mirrors that of Hamas. The social media sites appear only to remove the 
content of this organization under legal pressure. Facebook may avoid removing content and 
accounts pertaining to Hezbollah and Hamas either because specific pages contain non-violent 
content (and Facebook’s policies may permit only the removal of violent terrorist content) or 
because the company does not consider Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organizations. If 
Facebook’s and Twitter’s classifications of terrorism and violent content do not, in fact, cover 
Hamas or Hezbollah, then these organizations may continue to recruit followers on social media 
and to threaten international security through their violent tactics. If the social media companies 
provided American counterterrorism agencies with information on these groups, however, the 
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agencies could help to prevent terrorist recruitment and attacks facilitated through social media 
activity. 
 
III.VIII Social Media’s Obligations 
 Whether Facebook and Twitter provide United States counterterrorism agencies with 
terrorists’ content from their sites relies on the companies’ obligations to do so. Mark 
Zuckerberg, the CEO and creator of Facebook, has stated that he now holds the site responsible 
for posted content. Zuckerberg did not specify, however, in what way Facebook takes 
responsibility for content. Several critics of Zuckerberg and his company contest this statement, 
because of its vague nature and because the CEO does not imply an obligation to prevent 
terrorist activities on the social media site. Vernon Silver and Sarah Frier of Bloomberg 
Businessweek argued that Zuckerberg’s statement does not signify a moral or legal obligation but 
a public service (Silver and Frier). The Digital Citizens Alliance expressed skepticism towards 
Zuckerberg’s sense of responsibility and moral duty, arguing that the monetization of Facebook 
users’ content, regardless of the source, appears more important to the company (“Fool Me”). 
Jack Dorsey, the CEO of Twitter, did not make a statement like Zuckerberg’s, but given that a 
research report written by the Scientific American in June 2018 indicated that Twitter allowed 
more freedom for terrorists, whether Dorsey feels a responsibility towards the content on his site 
appears questionable (Macdonald). The Digital Citizens Alliance contended that, in order to fully 
motivate Twitter and Facebook’s capacities to remove the presence of terrorism, the U.S. 
government may need to make the companies legally accountable (“Fool Me”). 
The government can dictate legal requirements, especially those pertaining to terrorism. 
On January 24, 1995, former President Bill Clinton created Executive Order 12937, which 
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prohibited both foreign entities (including companies) from financially, materially, and 
technologically aiding state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored terrorist organizations (as listed 
by the DOS) and allowed the FBI to investigate these cases and to counteract them (U.S., 
Executive Office of the President, White House Office of the Press Secretary). Thus, the current 
president could argue that Facebook and Twitter technologically assist terrorist organizations by 
allowing them to gain recruits and spread messages of terrorism. If an FBI investigation proves 
these allegations true (and research seems to indicate this truth, at least in the cases of Hamas and 
Hezbollah), the FBI could require Twitter and Facebook to save all terrorism content from their 
pages and to share it with American counterterrorism agencies. In order to forego another FBI 
investigation into a subject that has already been studied by private researchers and government 
officials (See Section III.II), the American government could create a new law that would 
specifically obligate social media companies to save and share all information posted by 
suspected terrorists with government counterterrorism agencies. 
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Chapter IV: Solutions and Effects 
IV.I Intervention 
 If Facebook and Twitter cannot obligate themselves to effectively overcome the 
pervasive presence of terrorist groups on social media, then the American government must 
intervene. As Twitter’s reaction to Israel’s threat of legal action demonstrates, legal compulsion 
appears as likely the most effective method to disrupt terrorism on social media, even though 
social media companies could push back through campaigns against such laws. This intervention 
should not occur in a way which would eliminate the companies’ abilities to generate income 
and to achieve the purposes of their existence, of course, but which would benefit the companies 
and the government and would thwart terrorists’ activities on social media sites. A government 
policy that requires Facebook and Twitter to disseminate to counterterrorism agencies all 
information that their security systems collect on terrorist activity presents one solution. In this 
chapter, I outline my policy proposal, which contains several parts. I number and title each 
stipulation in terms of the general idea that relates to the function of each proposed requirement. 
Below the title of each policy specification, I describe its function. The specifications of the 
policy relate to setting parameters to define terrorism, to disseminate and store information, and 
to apprehend and convict suspects of terrorism. I then discuss the policy’s benefits for American 
counterterrorism agencies, Facebook, and Twitter. I also discuss practical and ethical downsides 
of the policy. I conclude the chapter by attempting to refute the downfalls of the policy and 
discussing why, despite the risks of the policy, it presents an important counterterrorism tactic. 
 
IV.II A Policy Proposal  
1. Policy operation under one definition of terrorism 
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 Because each counterterrorism agency and social media site operates under a different 
delineation of “terrorism,” a policy that involves this concept requires a single definition under 
which it may operate. As my classification of terrorism from Chapter 1 combines the definitions 
from the U.S. Legal Code, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
Facebook, it serves as the guideline for this policy proposal. I define terrorism as any veritable 
threat or act of violence against civilian and governmental populations and property in order to 
promote extremist ideologies through the fear of future attacks. “Extremist ideologies” or 
“extremism,” in this case, involves an ideological and deep-seated hatred towards any ethnic, 
religious, economic, political, or social groups that the individuals or groups holding such beliefs 
want severely changed or eliminated, with a willingness to resort to violence to achieve these 
objectives. The use of this classification of terrorism would require Facebook and Twitter to 
label both American and foreign entities as terrorists, including non-governmental organizations 
(such as ISIS ad Al Qaeda) and official political parties (such as Hamas and Hezbollah). While 
the inclusion of political parties (especially those legally elected to governments) under the 
concept of terrorism represents a change for Facebook and Twitter, who have allowed such 
groups to moderately thrive on their sites, the U.S. government already classifies some of these 
entities as terrorist organizations and works to combat them. As this definition of terrorism does 
not profile individuals or groups as terrorists based upon their religious or ethnic identities, 
Facebook, Twitter, and government agencies should not use profiling for this policy, either. 
2. Distribution of content from Facebook and Twitter to the National Counterterrorism 
Center, other American counterterrorism agencies, and foreign governments 
 As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the information contained on Facebook and Twitter that 
pertains to terrorist organizations could greatly assist U.S. counterterrorism agencies in their 
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missions to prevent acts of terrorism and to track terrorists. As the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) functions as the nexus for all American counterterrorism agencies and 
information, the Center creates an ideal primary distribution point. Because these social media 
companies often delete such data and do not share it with any government unless pressured, this 
policy obligates Twitter and Facebook to distribute to the NCTC information from their sites, as 
identified by the companies’ security teams and detection technologies, that pertains to terrorism. 
This content includes users’ social media activity, account details, and personal information. The 
social media companies can also choose to share relevant content with foreign governments and 
to enter into policies with foreign governments similar to this one. To ensure that the security of 
the program and that the social media companies accurately and actively target terrorists and 
terrorist organizations, American counterterrorism agencies should vet and contract individuals 
on the companies’ security teams to target and disseminate information on suspects. The 
government should certify these contracts through separate legislation or agreements with 
Twitter and Facebook. Upon receiving information from Facebook and Twitter, the NCTC must 
distribute this data to all other relevant U.S. counterterrorism agencies for analysis. The social 
media companies can also choose to share relevant content with foreign governments and to 
enter into policies with foreign governments similar to this one. 
3. Use of terrorism content by American counterterrorism agencies 
 Should American counterterrorism agencies, after analyzing the data provided by 
Facebook and Twitter, discover veritable and documented proof of terrorist activity in the form 
of recruitment, incitement to violence, verifiable threats, or planned attacks against the United 
States government, its citizens, or inhabitants or the recruitment of United States citizens or 
inhabitants for terrorist organizations or activities that pose a security threat for any country, the 
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agencies may use the information provided by these companies as legal grounds for further 
investigation and prosecution of domestic and foreign individuals and groups for charges of 
terrorism. If individuals found guilty of terrorism charges live outside of the Unites States, the 
government may request a warrant from the governments of the countries in which the suspects 
reside for their extradition or extraordinary rendition to and arrest in the United States. Once the 
government jails said terrorists, they will have no access to social media until the time at which 
the legal system either acquits the suspects of all charges or until they complete their sentences. 
In the case that the data provided on suspected terrorists demonstrates a threat solely to a foreign 
government, U.S. counterterrorism agencies may choose to deport them to the appropriate 
countries if the individuals live in the U.S., may request the provisional arrest of these suspects 
in the countries which hold warrants for their arrests, or may share said data with any and all 
relevant foreign governments. Should the information provided by these social media companies 
on suspected terrorists, after further analysis, not find any veritable and documented evidence of 
terrorist activity, the investigating agencies should destroy all of its copies of this information. In 
order to protect the identities of suspects, their cases and information should remain private at all 
times. 
4. Further stipulations for Facebook’s and Twitter’s future use of terrorism content 
 After disseminating pertinent information to the NCTC, the social media companies 
should remove all terrorist content and accounts from their platforms that demonstrate or incite 
violence, per their current rules. The social media companies may not sell or in any way 
disseminate this content to entities other than American counterterrorism agencies or foreign 
governments that could benefit from such content. Facebook and Twitter should eliminate 
accounts on a case-by-case basis, depending on the amount of activity on such platforms, as 
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demonstrated by the number of views, followers, and posts. American cybersecurity experts will 
set the limit for terrorist accounts’ activity before the social media sites must eliminate such 
pages and information. In order to ensure the efficacy and security of this policy, all involved 
entities (both governmental and private) should strive to keep its existence private (not secret). 
Facebook and Twitter must continue to store all information on separate platforms. In case future 
activity by users previously found to be innocent of terrorism actions and connections 
demonstrate a potential threat of terrorism, the social media companies must resend the old data 
to American counterterrorism agencies along with the new evidence.  
5. Penalties for Facebook’s and Twitter’s non-compliance with the policy 
 Should U.S. counterterrorism agencies find proof of non-compliance to the policy by 
Facebook and Twitter, the agencies should investigate and contend with the companies as 
appropriate for the situation. Examples of non-compliance may include a failure to collect 
information on terrorism as stipulated by the policy’s definition, a failure to disseminate all 
relevant information on terrorism to American counterterrorism agencies, or the dissemination of 
knowingly falsified information to American counterterrorism agencies. If American 
counterterrorism agencies find documented examples of non-compliance, they may lead a further 
investigation into those allegations. In the case that subsequent investigations into allegations of 
Facebook’s and Twitter’s non-compliance with the policy prove correct, the investigating 
agencies may declare these agencies as accomplices to terrorist groups and “unusual and 
extraordinary threats” to the security of the United States, per Section 1701 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Executive Order 12947 (91 Stat. 1626, 94 Stat. 
2025, and U.S, Executive Office of the President, White House Office of the Press Secretary). 
These agencies may then take any action necessary to mitigate the threat caused by these social 
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media companies, provided that such action does not prevent the non-terrorist users’ ability to 
utilize the communication services provided by such companies, as such disruption would 
interfere with American civilians’ freedom of speech. If necessary, the American government 
may enact new legislation to expedite this process of investigation and to outline appropriate 
penalties. 
 
IV.III Benefits for American Counterterrorism Agencies 
 Easy access to a wealth of information on suspected and known terrorists presents one of 
the main advantages of this policy for American counterterrorism agencies. Distribution of data 
from Facebook and Twitter to one distribution point (the NCTC) would ensure that all pertinent 
counterterrorism agencies would receive the same content, instead of the social media companies 
sending different information to individual agencies. The agencies would then possess access to 
a centralized point of information (the social media sites), which would provide them data from 
potential locations to possible future attacks on known and suspected terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. Certifying the locations of individual terrorists and terrorist organizations could 
furthermore reduce the amount of military strikes on civilian populations, which would in turn 
decrease the human and financial costs of such strategies. Counterterrorism agencies would not 
need to hire additional staff themselves to gather this information, as social media security teams 
already perform the collection activities, though they can contract individuals on the social media 
security teams. And by allowing small terrorist accounts to continue to exist on Twitter and 
Facebook, this factor reduces the risk of terrorists catching on to the U.S. government’s 
involvement, which could lead terrorists to provide false information or to instead utilize more 
secure platforms, such as the Dark Web (Berger). Thus, the policy could promote social media as 
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a sustainable source of information on terrorist activity. While information collection from social 
media should certainly not replace all other sources of data, this method provides a useful tool 
through which American counterterrorism agencies can obtain a diverse spread of information. 
 U.S. counterterrorism agencies may furthermore bring charges against and prosecute 
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations based solely on their social media activity. If 
suspects’ actions on social media prove that they make valid threats against the American 
government, its citizens, or its inhabitants (in other words, the suspects would act on such 
threats), the accused individuals and groups may be arrested and charged for incitement to 
terrorism-related violence based on this information alone. Proof that the suspected individuals 
assist in the planning of terrorist attacks against America as in the above scenario also provide 
grounds for the same actions taken against said accused individuals and groups. Finally, the U.S. 
government can arrest suspected terrorist individuals and groups (if the U.S. holds a warrant for 
their arrest) or request the provisional arrest of suspects (if foreign governments, not the U.S. 
possess a warrant for their arrest) based on their recruitment of American citizens or inhabitants 
of the United States for terrorist groups or activities, if the groups and activities threaten the 
security of America or of a foreign state. Basing charges on information from social media also 
allows counterterrorism agencies to expend less time, effort, and money on tracking every 
activity of terrorists and terrorist groups across a variety of platforms in order to prosecute these 
suspects. If the U.S. government can slow the recruitment stream on social media and can 
prosecute enough terrorists, especially those who play an important role in terrorist 
organizations, the government could destabilize terrorist groups and reduce the threats that they 
pose to America and to the world. 
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IV.IV Benefits for Facebook and Twitter  
 While the benefits of this policy undoubtedly appear more in favor of American 
counterterrorism agencies than of Facebook and Twitter, these companies can still profit from 
the policy. The government can contract individuals or groups in the social media companies to 
perform the security checks, which would allow the companies to generate some profit. The 
permitted existence of smaller terrorist pages under this policy also provides the social media 
sites with a continuous cash influx (as the companies accrue funds through the sale of their users’ 
information), despite the fact that the sites may lose some revenue from the removal of large 
terrorist accounts and their contents from the social media platforms (as the companies accrue 
funds through the sale of their users’ information). The decreased presence of terrorism on these 
platforms may also encourage users’ trust in and praise for the companies, which currently face 
heavy criticism from social media skeptics, current users, and researchers. While the policy 
should remain private, Twitter and Facebook can certainly publicize their increased removal of 
terrorist accounts and content in order to garner support. This increased effort to combat 
terrorism may encourage more investors, who previously avoided social media due to the 
pervasive presence of terrorism, to invest in the social media platforms. If Facebook and Twitter 
fully comply with the policy, they can certainly benefit monetarily from the decrease in legal 
measures threatened and undertaken by the U.S. government due to the existence of terrorism on 
the sites.  
 The section of the policy which allows the U.S. government to prosecute suspected 
terrorists and terrorist organizations based on their social media activity can also assist Facebook 
and Twitter, though in a more indirect manner. Terrorists continue to create pages and post 
information even after social media security teams remove their other accounts and content, 
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which creates a sort of endless disease on the sites. However, if American counterterrorism 
agencies caught and arrested terrorists, especially those with an active presence on social media, 
Facebook and Twitter would have less content and fewer pages to track, creating less strain on 
security teams. The ban on social media usage for arrested suspects would also help to slow 
terrorist activity, as jailed terrorists would possess virtually no outlet for which to use social 
media. While capturing terrorists remains difficult, and new terrorist cells and individual users 
can pop up on social media platforms, U.S. and foreign counterterrorism agencies possess a 
variety of tactics in their arsenal that can mitigate this issue (including community building and 
terrorist rehabilitation, which could draw individuals away from terrorism support). 
Virtual “bots” used by terrorists to formulate accounts and content on social media 
platforms do pose a separate concern (Berger). However, terrorists must oversee and maintain 
these bots but if Facebook and Twitter’s security systems can continue to discover and eliminate 
bot-generated content and the sources of these bots, and counterterrorism agencies can arrest the 
creators and maintainers of the bots with the companies’ assistance, this collaboration can reduce 
the strain that bots cause on social media security systems. Of course, the elimination of the 
presence and threat of terrorist individuals and organizations on Facebook and Twitter will 
remain impossible to achieve completely, even with this policy. Despite this impossibility, the 
combined efforts of Facebook, Twitter, and American counterterrorism agencies can compound 
on the success of the social media companies’ current efforts. 
 
IV.V Practical and Ethical Concerns 
 Though this policy provides many positive outcomes for both Facebook and Twitter and 
U.S. counterterrorism agencies, the policy faces potential setbacks in terms of the 
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implementation of all of its parts and the ethical issues surrounding privacy breaches. One of the 
practical concerns of the policy pertains to Facebook and Twitter’s compliance. The policy 
makes many demands of these companies, from the requirement to share information that 
pertains to terrorist activity to the requirement to remove all terrorist accounts and content with 
more than a few hundred followers, likes, and shares, with little direct benefit for either social 
media site. While Facebook and Twitter would profit from the dissemination of information to 
the NCTC, they currently profit from the sale of their users’ data (regardless of the users’ 
criminal statuses) to private companies (“Fool Me”). Thus, the social media companies could 
lose money by not selling to a variety of private companies. Other than the legal obligation to 
comply to all facets of the policy, the companies currently seem to possess no incentive to 
comply. As Facebook’s and Twitter’s track records demonstrate, their main objectives center 
around the accrual of profits through the connection of users from around the world and the sale 
of those users’ information (“Fool Me”). 
The negative consequences of non-compliance by Facebook and Twitter for U.S. 
counterterrorism agencies range from inconvenient to potentially disastrous, depending on the 
type of non-compliance. The failure of these social media companies to share important 
terrorism-related information from their sites to pertinent agencies presents one problem. While 
receiving some information from Twitter and Facebook benefits government counterterrorism 
actions more than no information, which closely represents the current relationship between the 
social media sites and counterterrorism agencies, the missing information could prove crucial to 
the location and arraignment of wanted terrorists and to the prevention of terrorist attacks. The 
consequences of this missing information on potential terrorists and terrorist attacks could result 
in human casualties and infrastructure damage as a result of acts of terrorism. In theory Facebook 
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and Twitter would share the most crucial data with the relevant governmental agencies if legally 
obligated. However, this assumption remains untested, since this policy remains as a mere 
proposal, and thus could prove incorrect. The companies could also share over-share data with 
very little connection to terrorism (a form of malicious compliance), which would increase the 
amount of information that counterterrorism agencies would need to analyze (which would 
necessitate an increase in funding, labor, and time) and would compromise the privacy of 
innocent individuals. 
The dissemination of knowingly-falsified information (data that the sites either falsified 
themselves or that external sources falsified with the prior knowledge or consent of Facebook 
and Twitter) to counterterrorism agencies presents another form of possible non-compliance by 
Facebook and Twitter. Depending on the nature of the falsification, such as a change in the 
suspect’s name, and the government’s reaction to the information prior to the discovery of the 
falsification, such as questioning the wrong suspect for further information, the results could 
present simply a waste of the government’s and the suspect’s time. However, if the falsification 
presented itself as a change in the location of a planned terrorist attack or the government reacted 
hostilely towards a suspect, this disinformation could result severe consequences, such as the 
deaths or injuries of innocent civilians. This second scenario presents an extreme and highly 
unlikely possibility, as Facebook and Twitter possess no discernable reason to risk so many 
innocent lives. As the companies have no clear need to falsify information, as well, this scenario 
seems unlikely to occur. However, as in the first example of potential non-compliance, this 
supposition of the social media companies’ potential motives and actions remains unverified.  
 The publicization by Facebook or Twitter of the policy’s existence or the contents of the 
policy represents the third and final form of non-compliance. As the policy and its stipulations 
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suggest privacy, a leak of any nature could threaten the policy’s efficacy and sustainability. If 
Facebook and Twitter (or government agents) reveal this policy to the public, terrorists targeted 
by the policy will undoubtedly learn of its existence as well. If terrorists realize that the 
government uses their information on social media to locate and arrest them, terrorist individuals 
and groups may begin to spread false information (false flags) on their accounts or to switch to a 
different platform (such as the dark web) in order to spread their messages. These consequences 
would severely reduce (if not eliminate) the usefulness of terrorism content on social media to 
counterterrorism agencies (Berger). U.S. counterterrorism agencies would then lack a valuable 
source of data on terrorist activity and would have to concentrate their efforts on other online 
platforms. 
 Public knowledge of this counterterrorism policy, whether obtained from a leak by social 
media companies, government employees, or other sources, would also undoubtedly lead to 
backlash from civilians and foreign governments world-wide regarding the ethics of such a 
policy. Even though this policy intends that American counterterrorism agencies only analyze 
suspected terrorists’ social media accounts, would not actively search for said accounts 
themselves (allowing Twitter’s and Facebook’s security teams to collect relevant data), and must 
remove from their systems all information that does not clearly prove a connection to terrorist 
organizations and activities, the public may consider this practice as a breach of privacy. Public 
outrage from previous privacy breaches by the U.S. government and social media companies 
demonstrates the likelihood that this policy would spark controversy. When Edward Snowden 
leaked information that proved the public’s suspicions that the NSA tapped and analyzed 
civilians’ electronic communications, the American government overall faced heavy criticism 
and the decreased trust of the American community (Geiger).  
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Facebook and Twitter’s dissemination of data to the American government represents 
another ethical concern of the policy that would likely cause backlash if knowledge of the policy 
became public. When the international community discovered in 2018 that Facebook sold its 
users’ data to advertising companies and other businesses, the public and the media criticized the 
company for violating the privacy of its users, and the U.S. government sued the company, 
although Facebook’s user policy allowed the site to sell such data (Hern and Pegg). Despite the 
fact that, in the case of this policy, the selling of data would facilitate the U.S. government’s 
ability to carry out counterterrorism actions, the public could criticize the government’s 
hypocrisy of condemning the selling of social media data while simultaneously buying and using 
it. Given the historical public criticism surrounding counterterrorism policy and privacy scandals 
in the public and private sectors, a policy that required Facebook and Twitter to share suspected 
terrorists’ information with American counterterrorism agencies would certainly cause criticism, 
even if the policy demonstrated large successes. The result of such backlash could cause current 
users of Facebook and Twitter to leave the platform, reducing revenue for the companies. The 
government to revoke this policy as a result of public criticism, which would remove an 
important source of knowledge on current terrorists and their activities. 
Another ethical concern of this policy relates not necessarily to non-compliance by 
Twitter and Facebook but to racial and religious profiling. The social media companies and 
counterterrorism agencies could set the parameters of their security and information collection 
and analysis tools to specifically target certain ethnic or religious groups (such as Arabs or 
Muslims). Profiling under this policy would mean that social media users of some identities 
would more likely face accusations and investigations of terrorist activity than users of other 
backgrounds. The users of target backgrounds could also face a denial of service by social media 
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companies. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights found in 
2018 that Facebook’s current definition of terrorism, which broadly associates non-state armed 
groups and violence with terrorism, could cause governments to further stigmatize and repress 
dissent and opposition and the rights of specific ethnic groups, whether or not these groups use 
violence. This non-specific definition could also result in Facebook over-regulating certain 
accounts or denying its services to individuals with no verifiable connection to terrorism 
(OHCHR). Besides the injustice of targeting individuals and groups based on their ethnicities or 
religions, counterterrorism agencies could miss out on important information and leads on 
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations who do not fit into these target parameters. Since 
terrorists come from a wide variety of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds world-wide, 
this profiling could pose a major problem for the government’s counterterrorism actions. 
 
IV.VI A Necessary Step Forward 
 Although this policy proposal undoubtedly presents several practical and ethical 
concerns, the policy contains certain caveats in order to ameliorate these issues. In terms of 
Facebook’s and Twitter’s potential non-compliance with the policy, the proposal includes a 
section that stipulates the actions that the United States government may undertake in regard to 
these actions, if the government can find evidence of non-compliance. The government may first 
investigate such allegations against the social media companies. If the accusations against the 
companies prove true, the government may declare that Twitter and Facebook present threats to 
the security of the United States by aiding terrorists. The legal system can then “punish” the 
companies in any method that the government sees fit, as long as the discipline does not impact 
the freedom of speech of the users of the social media sites. This punishment could take the form 
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of heavy fines against executives or central shareholders (although this tactic has not always 
proven effective against companies in the past). In this way the social media companies can 
continue to function without disruption for their users. This stipulation that allows the American 
government to penalize Facebook and Twitter for a breach of the policy would theoretically 
prevent the companies from doing so. Even if the companies do not provide U.S. 
counterterrorism agencies with all of the identified information from their sites that pertained to 
terrorism, access to even some of that content (assuming the content proves true) would benefit 
counterterrorism agencies more than no information (Steinbach). In terms of malicious 
compliance by Facebook and Twitter, the policy attempts to mitigate this threat by setting 
boundaries for the characteristics of terrorism and the types of content that the companies should 
share and by not specifying that the companies need to share all content discovered. These 
factors cannot completely eliminate the possibility of malicious compliance but can assist in 
ameliorating it. 
 As long as Facebook, Twitter, and American counterterrorism agencies with knowledge 
of this policy attempt to maintain its privacy, the policy can likely avoid discovery by individual 
terrorists and terrorist organizations. Twitter and Facebook already publicize the fact that they 
target and remove terrorists’ accounts and content from the sites, and since the policy does not 
require the removal of all accounts and information pertaining to terrorism (so long as the 
amount of activity remains low), the government and the social media companies can mitigate 
terrorists’ suspicion. Though the policy does allow the U.S. government to arrest suspected 
terrorists based upon the information that they post on social media, and the prosecutors may 
need to demonstrate that they obtained the content lawfully and without a violation of due 
process, the government does not need to reveal the full extent of the policy. The government 
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currently uses content from social media to arrest individuals on suspicion of terrorism, though 
tip-offs from other users and publicly available content generally provide the source of 
information, but sometimes leave the name of the informant anonymous (U.S, Dept. of Justice, 
U.S. Attorney’s Office: Eastern District of Virginia). This step can further protect the policy’s 
existence from the knowledge of terrorists who use social media, which in turn can promote the 
policy’s efficacy and sustainability. If small-time accounts can continue to utilize the platforms 
without the knowledge American of government interference, they can continue to post veritable 
content on the social media sites, thus providing U.S. counterterrorism agencies with a reliable 
source of information on current terrorism trends (Berger). 
 Even if the policy can remain private from the eyes of the international public and the 
media, however, the ethical and legal concern surrounding the American government’s 
interference with personal information still exists. While the information analyzed by 
counterterrorism agencies ideally relates to terrorists, who can pose a global threat to civilians 
and governments, the government’s right to analyze private information posted online remains 
questionable due to a potential violation of individuals’ privacy and the freedom of speech. In 
order to diminish this criticism, a section of the policy proposal stipulates that if the government 
agencies who analyze the data sent by Facebook and Twitter find no verifiable connection to 
terrorism, the agencies must delete all copies of this information from their files. The 
government therefore cannot discriminate against or harass users based on their social media 
activity if the users possess no connection to terrorism. The stipulation that the identities and data 
collected on suspects must remain privates further assists to protect the identities and reputations 
of individuals found guilty or innocent. In order to protect the identities and reputations of 
individuals who might otherwise be targets of ethnic or religious profiling, the policy also 
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recommends that Facebook, Twitter, and American counterterrorism agencies not utilize 
profiling for any part of the policy.  
The fact that Twitter and Facebook, not the United States government, identify and 
collect only content that appears to pertain to terrorism per a set definition further mitigates the 
policy’s ethical dilemmas. The government should not have access to the information of 
individuals who do not fit under the delineation of terrorism used by the policy. Critics could still 
target American counterterrorism agencies (or the government in general) and the social media 
companies for the sharing and use of private information to arrest individuals. However, the 
policy will likely demonstrate success in the arrest of terrorists and the prevention of terrorist 
attacks, and thus the benefits of this policy far outweigh the ethical and practical concerns.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
V.I Future Policy Expansions 
 While the policy proposal in Chapter IV centers on the use of terrorist content from 
Facebook and Twitter (as disseminated by these companies) for counterterrorism actions, the 
U.S. government could expand the subject matter, online platforms, and level of involvement 
covered by the policy. Terrorism on social media does present an easily-identifiable threat to the 
American government and civilians, but several other entities threaten the United States as well. 
Both state-based and non-state-based actors target the U.S. on social media. And the threats 
posed by these actors present themselves on platforms beyond Facebook and Twitter, including 
YouTube, Google+, and Instagram. Several sites have uncovered some of the content by 
subversive entities but do not always share this knowledge with the government. This lack of 
information distribution may signify that the American government needs to play a more direct 
role in the collection of relevant data from social media and general online sites. In this chapter I 
elaborate on the possible expansions of the policy proposal from Chapter IV, including subject 
matter, online platforms, and government involvement level. I discuss the potential downfalls for 
each form of expansion, highlighting the reasons for which I did not include the factors as a part 
of my policy. 
 
V.II Subject Matter Expansion 
 Many countries and coalitions besides terrorists and terrorist organizations threaten the 
security of the United States. Since the Cold War, Russia has used various forms of media to 
spread disinformation about America. With the rise of social media, the Russian government 
became proficient at spreading deliberately falsified information at a rapid rate. This tactic of 
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disinformation has, in combination with the use of fake accounts on social media, caused social 
and political destabilization in the United States that led to public riots and influenced the 2016 
American Presidential Elections (Ellick). The American government possessed little knowledge 
of this involvement until 2016 but did not know much about the extent until the 2017 and 2018 
investigations into allegations of Russian election interference and Facebook’s privacy problems. 
Though Russia used Facebook to influence elections and spread disinformation, only 
government investigations uncovered this information, of which Facebook admitted knowledge 
only under legal pressure. Later in 2018 Facebook security teams did share information with the 
American and British government of Iran’s involvement in 2016 election tampering on social 
media, but the company’s openness in this case appears as a means to salvage its reputation after 
the aforementioned privacy scandal (Breland). If the government cannot trust social media 
companies to share this information or to stop the spread of disinformation by subversive 
countries unless under duress, the government may need to undertake legal action in order to 
obtain such content. With this data, the American government can analyze and expose the 
subversive actions of countries like Russia and Iran and hopefully work to prevent future threats 
by the states. 
 Besides countries whose actions on social media threaten the security and stability of the 
United States, groups such as human and sex traffickers and drug gangs use social media to carry 
out their functions. The FBI has identified and charged several individuals of sex trafficking and 
human trafficking on social media, especially involving the trafficking of children. In 2014 the 
Bureau investigated and arraigned a Texan man on allegations of using social media to lure in 
young girls for sex trafficking and sexual exploitation (U.S., Dept. of Justice, FBI, “Sex 
Trafficker”). Drug trafficking, which also affects the health and safety of American youth, 
63 
 
represents another pervasive problem that the U.S. government attempts to handle. The 
Department of Justice sentenced 15 defendants in August 2018 for drug trafficking heroine from 
Ciudad Juarez to Las Cruces, New Mexico. Social media facilitated this drug trafficking pipeline 
for several years (U.S., Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office: District of New Mexico, “Multi-
Agency Investigation”). These articles and investigation reports do not state whether civilian tip-
offs or social media companies alerted the government to these instances of trafficking, nor did 
the government announce whether the social media companies knew of these activities. Given 
the threat that trafficking in its many forms poses to communities world-wide, if social media 
security teams either do not notice or do not report of their own volition these crimes to pertinent 
governments, countries around the world besides America may have to resort to legal force. 
After the U.S. government brought so many of these trafficking crimes that involve social media 
to court, the social media companies cannot deny knowledge of the crimes’ existence on their 
platforms. And if the companies know of these crimes on their platforms and still do nothing to 
correct the situation, are they not guilty of aiding and abetting these criminals? Though this 
thesis and proposal focus on terrorism, due to the existence of other threatening activities on 
social media, government agencies could expand my policy proposal to include subversive 
activities and trafficking crimes among the content that Facebook and Twitter must turn over to 
the agencies. 
   
V.III Online Platform Expansion 
 Facebook and Twitter do not represent the only online sites, let alone social media sites, 
which traffickers, terrorists, and other entities use to carry out their destructive activities. While 
these two social media companies arguably contain the most diverse types of information in one 
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location and already take some action against terrorists and other subversive groups, these 
entities also utilize sites such as YouTube, Instagram, and Google+. To combat criminal activity 
on the sites, Facebook (including its site Instagram), Twitter, Google (including its sites 
YouTube and Google+), and Microsoft created the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism 
(GIFCT) in 2017. The GIFCT uses computer algorithms to target terrorist content on the sites 
and to alert other sites to the same content so that all involved online platforms can delete the 
threatening information (Macdonald). These computer algorithms, though, do not catch all 
terrorist content, as terrorists now use code-words in their posts in order to avoid detection, nor 
do the algorithms target other forms of criminal activity (like trafficking). Even when the 
algorithms do reveal strong signs of terrorism activities and beliefs, social media companies do 
not always address these issues. Members of the GIFCT also did not announce whether they 
share terrorism-related content with any governments in order to track the terrorists (Lapowsky). 
Thus, the U.S. government again loses valuable data, from photographs to videos to personal 
information, that it could use to capture and arrest or extradite terrorists. I did not include 
platforms beyond Facebook and Twitter in my thesis and proposal because those two present the 
greatest diversity of data in one location, but the government could nonetheless expand my 
policy to include other sites in order to obtain further content on terrorists.  
 
V.IV Direct Government Involvement 
 Regardless of whether the American government expands my current policy proposal, 
social media sites covered by the policy may not disseminate any or all required content, despite 
the consequences of non-compliance, or may engage in malicious compliance. In this instance 
the government may chose to grow the policy in another direction in order to legally protect its 
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direct involvement in the collection of terrorist information and to assure that the government 
receives all (and only) relevant data. As revealed by Edward Snowden, the National Security 
Agency already uses advanced technological programs to analyze and gather content on 
suspected terrorists from Facebook. The NSA does share this information with the FBI and 
certain allied foreign counterterrorism agencies when necessary, but content from the Snowden 
leaks did not reveal the extent of information disseminated or if the NSA shared information 
with other American counterterrorism agencies (Greenwald 137-64). Following the Snowden 
leaks, the NSA also faced criticism from civilians and governments world-wide on the legality of 
its operations (Geiger). With a policy that would legally permit the National Counterterrorism 
Center to collect information on terrorists’ social media activities and to then share this data with 
all other U.S. counterterrorism agencies, the government could ensure that all pertinent agencies 
received the information necessary to carry out counterterrorism activities and that the NCTC 
collected this data by legal means. This type of direct involvement, though, would likely 
necessitate a greater increase in funding, labor, and time for American counterterrorism agencies 
than my policy would. 
 Even if my policy legally protected the NCTC’s right to gather and share content from 
social media, these actions would likely still fuel the same debate on security versus privacy that 
the NSA’s actions did, should someone reveal this policy to the public. Both my current policy 
and the NSA’s strategies contain the caveat that, if agencies find the content that they collected 
to be innocent of criminal activity, the agencies cannot save this information (Greenwald 137-
64). Despite this rule governments and civilians still criticized the NSA for its breach of privacy 
(as critics possessed no way to assure that their information was not saved by the NSA), and thus 
my policy would likely face the same backlash if publicly disclosed (Geiger). Social media sites 
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could also file lawsuits against the government for interfering with their abilities to function, 
make money, and protect the privacy of users. In case Facebook and Twitter do not comply with 
the policy and disseminate terrorist content, the government must decide whether the benefits 
from the direct collection of data from social media outweigh the potential risks. While I found 
the risks of direct U.S. government involvement too great to include in the policy proposal, and 
thus attempted to find other means by which counterterrorism agencies could obtain the same 
data, agencies that potentially use this policy may disagree. 
 
V.V Current Implications 
 Though my policy proposal in Chapter IV offers several options for its expansion, if 
Facebook, Twitter, and American counterterrorism agencies follow the stipulations of the policy 
as intended, the policy should increase these actors’ capacities to combat terrorism both online 
and in the real world. If the social media companies and government agencies all operate under 
one definition of terrorism, as the policy dictates, they can assure a cohesion of information and 
understanding of terrorism. The use of the NCTC as the main distribution center further helps to 
streamline the process of content dissemination, as Twitter and Facebook only need to share 
information with one government point, not several, and the NCTC can then send this data to all 
relevant counterterrorism agency (as it already serves as a hub for U.S. counterterrorism 
information and activity). Counterterrorism agencies can then use this information to investigate, 
track, and arrest suspected terrorists, and can charge individuals for terrorism-related crimes 
based on their social media content.  
 Certain setbacks do exist within the policy, though I do attempt to ameliorate them as 
much as possible. Agents from American counterterrorism agencies, employees Facebook and 
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Twitter, or spies for other governments could reveal the policy and its contents to the public or to 
terrorists, making the policy less effective and causing criticism world-wide. Facebook and 
Twitter could also decide not to disseminate any or all terrorist content with the NCTC, which 
would cause counterterrorism agencies to lose potentially crucial information. I try to diminish 
the severity of these potential issues by not allowing the counterterrorism agencies themselves to 
breach privacy and personally examine social media, by requiring counterterrorism agencies to 
delete the social media information of individuals found innocent of terrorism after analysis, and 
by including consequences for policy non-compliance by Facebook and Twitter. Only an official 
test of this policy could, unfortunately, reveal the efficacy of these attempts to reduce the 
policy’s problems.  
Despite the potential drawbacks of my policy, though, the information that the American 
government could obtain from suspected terrorists’ social media accounts. From Facebook and 
Twitter data, counterterrorism agencies could obtain information on suspected terrorists’ 
personal information, such as their identities, locations, friends, family, interests from the content 
that the terrorists post (@dew_mari and Dewicki). Counterterrorism agencies could use this 
content to track terrorists, build cases against them, arrest them, and punish them under U.S. law 
or deport them to other countries who brought charges against the individuals (U.S., Dept. of 
Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office: District of New Mexico, “Two New Mexico Men”). The 
Department of Justice (and its subsidiary, the FBI) already use data from social media to arrest 
and charge terrorists, but this information comes primarily from civilian tip-offs, and thus the 
government lacks a wealth of information that it could use to find and charge other suspects 
(Steinbach). This content could permit American counterterrorism agencies to investigate and 
arrest individuals and break up the functions of major terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, 
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ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah, which maintain a constant presence on social media (Silver and 
Frier). 
The United States government already utilizes several different tactics in a variety of 
agencies in order to combat terrorism. Drone strikes, espionage, community-building, and 
humanitarian aid represent only a few of the strategies used by agencies such as the DOS, FBI, 
DoD, CIA, and NSA (Wiley). Facebook and Twitter also employ their own counterterrorism 
techniques, including the identification of terrorism-related accounts and content by 
sophisticated computer technology and the removal of these accounts and content from the social 
media platforms (Macdonald). Counterterrorism researchers from private institutions such as the 
Stimson Center and Digital Citizens Alliance, however, criticize the efficacy of governmental 
and social media counterterrorism methods and argue that the agencies should find cheaper, less 
destructive, and more precise means of combatting terrorism (Belasco et al. and “Fool Me”). 
Despite the impossibility of completely and permanently defeating terrorism, my policy attempts 
to diminish the setbacks faced by U.S. counterterrorism agencies, Facebook, and Twitter so that 
they possess the information necessary to improve their current techniques and to destabilize 
terrorist organizations both online and offline. When combatting terrorism and protecting human 
lives, the joint efforts of the private and public sectors together present a more potent threat to 
terrorism than several disjointed actions from a variety of independent groups. 
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